L A O G A I HANDBOOK
2005 – 2006
The Laogai Research Foundation
Washington, DC
2006
Our Statement
We have no right to forget those deprived of freedom and
life in the Laogai.
We are seeking the truth and hoping that such horrible
and inhumane practices will cease to exist as soon as
possible, and will never recur.
In China, democracy and Laogai are incompatible.
我们没有权利忘却劳改营中失去自由及生命的人。
我们在寻求真理
,
希望这类残暴及非人道的行为早日
消除并且永不再现。
在中国,民主与劳改不可能并存。
THE LAOGAI RESEARCH FOUNDATION
The Laogai Research Foundation, founded in 1992, is a non-profit, tax-exempt organization [501 (c) (3)] incorporated in the Sta
te of
Virginia, USA. The Foundation’s purpose is to gather information on the Chinese Laogai – the most extensive system of forced l
abor
camps in the world today – and disseminate this information to
journalists, human rights activists, government officials and th
e general
public.
Directors: Harry Wu, Jeffrey Fiedler, Tienchi Liao
LRF Board: Harry Wu, Jeffrey Fiedler,
Tienchi Liao, Lodi Gyari, Joseph Brodecki
Laogai Handbook
劳改手册
2005-2006
Copyright
©
The Laogai Research Foundation (LRF)
All Rights Reserved.
The Laogai Research Foundation
1420 K Street, NW, 3rd Floor
Washington, DC 20005
Tel: (202) 833-8770
Fax: (202) 833-6187
E-mail: laogai@laogai.org
ISBN 1-931550-39-5
Published by The Laogai Research Foundation, October 2006
Printed in Hong Kong
US $30.00

Table of Contents
Code Page
Preface
前言
…………………………………………………… …1
Introduction to China’s Laogai
劳改制度概述
……….. …5
Abbreviations and Readers’ Guide
缩写词和读者指南
……………………………………………….27
Map of the People’s Republic of China
中华人民共和国地图
…………………………………………….29
01 Shanxi Province
山西省
……………………………………….31
02 Guangdong Province
广东省
………………………………..42
03 Beijing Municipality
北京市
……………………………………66
04 Tianjin Municipality
天津市
……………………………………75
05 Hebei Province
河北省
…………………………………………80
06 Guizhou Province
贵州省
……………………………………..91
07 Guangxi Aut. Region
广西壮族自治区
…………………. 105
08 Hunan Province
湖南省
……………………………………. 115
09 Jiangxi Province
江西省
…………………………………… 135
10 Fujian Province
福建省
…………………………………….. 144
11 Yunnan Province
云南省
…………………………………… 156
12 Gansu Province
甘肃省
……………………………………. 174
13 Xizang Aut. Region (Tibet)
西藏自治区
……………….. 184
14 Ningxia Aut. Region
宁夏自治区
………………………… 189
15 Xinjiang Uighur Aut. Region
新疆自治区
……………… 194
16 Qinghai Province
青海省
…………………………………… 212
17 Shaanxi Province
陕西省
………………………………….. 225
18 Sichuan Province
四川省
………………………………….. 237
19 Hubei Province
湖北省
……………………………………… 258
20 Zhejiang Province
浙江省
…………………………………. 277
Code Page
21 Shandong Province
山东省
…………………………………. 290
22 Anhui Province
安徽省
……………………………………….. 322
23 Jiangsu Province
江苏省
…………………………………….. 335
24 Heilongjiang Province
黑龙江省
…………………………… 352
25 Nei Menggu Aut. Region
内蒙古自治区
…………………. 373
26 Jilin Province
吉林省
………………………………………….. 389
27 Liaoning Province
辽宁省
……………………………………. 403
28 Henan Province
河南省
………………………………………. 431
29 Shanghai Municipality
上海市
………………………………. 452
30 Hainan Province
海南省
……………………………………… 470
31 Chongqing Municipality
重庆市
……………………………. 474
Involvement of the U.
S. Customs Service
美国海关总署有关劳改产品的措施
……………………….. 481
Hearings, briefings and testimony on the Laogai
and human rights in China
劳改问题听证会
……………. 485
Publications by the Laogai Research Foundation
劳改基金会出版物
……………………………………………… 489
Recommended Reading
劳改问题参考资料
…………… 493
Official Legislative Documents on Reform Through
Labor and Reeducation Through Labor In PRC
中华人民共和国劳改劳教法令与资料
…………………….. 495

Preface
1
Preface
Over the past decade, China has awed the world with its rapid
economic development. By the end of 2006, China’s Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) annual gr
owth is expected to reach
10.7%, and 9.8% by 2007.
1
China is also becoming a major
power in international politics mo
st recently as a mediator in
the ongoing North Korea negotiations, and its expanding
relationships with African nations. Many scholars theorize that
economic development is a catal
yst for democratization and
liberalization, yet in the case of China this is far from true.
2
In
fact, the more China advances, the more its people are
restricted politically and socially. The Chinese government
recognizes that stability is para
mount to maintaining power and
fulfilling its economic goals. The Laogai, China’s brutal system
of labor camps, continues to be not only an important tool of
repression, but also an import
ant source of revenue for the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP).
In 1994, increased international attention to the Laogai system
caused the Chinese government to drop the term
Laogai
(reform through labor) from its
official documents and replace
it with the word
prison
. This gesture was designed to create the
impression abroad that the Chin
ese penal system is similar to
those in the West. However, the fundamental roles of the
1
na/profile.cfm?folder=Profile-
Forecast.
2
e.htm#WHAT%20IS%20THE%20IMPACT%20OF%20ECONOM
IC%20INTEGRATION(txt).
Laogai are the same as they were during Chairman Mao
Zedong’s reign. The function of “reform through labor” is
continuously emphasized, and the slogan for the Laogai
Reform first, production second,” is still written on the
prisons gates. Millions of Chinese in the Laogai face daily
“reform” exercises and political
indoctrination. Mental and
physical abuse is common. The Laojiao (reeducation through
labor) component of the Laogai, revived in the early 1980s,
gives the government the right to arrest and detain dissenters
without a formal charge or trial
for up to three years. Laojiao is
commonly used for punishing and suppressing political and
religious dissent, and is currently exercised to suppress the
Falun Gong and Christian movements.
The “production” aspect of th
e Laogai slogan highlights the
dual roles of the system. In 1988 the Ministry of Justice in the
Criminal Reform Handbook
stated that the
Laogai “organizes
criminals in labor and production, thus creating wealth for
society.” Our research and analysis shows that the Laogai has
benefited tremendously from globa
lization. International trade
provides the camps access to hard
currency as they export their
products– everything from socks to diesel engines, raw cotton
to processed graphite. Throughout the last decade, Laogai
enterprises in certain regions, most notably Liaoning and
Shandong provinces, have developed into small economic
empires. These camps produce hundreds of millions of yuan in
profit and pay millions in taxes. The international community
and even the ordinary Chinese citizen is completely unaware of
how the economic function of the Laogai often supersedes the
legal purpose.

Preface

Preface
3
could often only be accessed for two or three days before they
vanished. LRF attributes this to the ongoing CCP campaign to
keep Laogai information from the public. On the other hand,
any statistics regarding Laogai production were emphasized
and available to anyone. Other sources include LRF’s own
document archives and LRF employ
ee secret investigations of
Laogai camps, sources from th
e Library of Congress for
historical statistics, and fi
rst hand accounts from former
prisoners.
4
Some descriptions of working conditions within the
camps were found on http://www.minghui.org, a Falun Gong created
website and are noted. Although we cannot verify the
statements on this site, from previous research and other
sources with similar accounts, LRF believes they are accurate.
The Laogai Research Foundation be
lieves that as long as the
Chinese Communist Party’s dictatorship exists, the Laogai will
continue to serve as its essential mechanism for suppression
and persecution. China is a grow
ing world power and with this
power must come responsibility. The most vital responsibility
for a government is to respect the human rights of its people.
The Laogai system, like the Sovi
et Gulag, is a violation of
basic human rights. The Laogai is incompatible with freedom
and democracy.
We invite you to read the
Laogai Handbook
carefully, to
contemplate the number of camp
s, the variety of goods made,
4
Province Chronicles: Anhui
renmin chubanshe 1989-1999 (Anhui
province), Shandong renmin chubanshe, 1998 (Shandong province),
Shanghai shehui kexueyuan chubanshe,
2003
(Shanghai).
and to think of the men and wo
men who are suffering in the
Laogai today. Only the attention of the world can bring about
an end to that suffering, and this begins with you.
This edition of the
Laogai Handbook
was created by LRF
Executive Director Harry Wu, Di
rector Tienchi Liao, and LRF
staff Penny Yu, Shirley Gan, and Lisa Pertoso. LRF would like
to extend its gratitude to the National Endowment for
Democracy, which makes projects like this possible. We are
also deeply indebted to certain persons in China who cannot be
named but provided us with invaluable information used in this
book.
The Laogai Research Foundation
October 2006

Introduction
5
Introduction
Dictatorships throughout history have used mechanisms of fear
and control to maintain the absolute power of their regime and
annihilate political dissent. Hitler built the concentration camps
of the twentieth century not only to terminate the Jews but also
to destroy his political opposition. Lenin began building labor
camps right after the Russian Revolution to punish the anti-
Bolshevik “unreliable elements” in 1918. His heir Stalin threw
tens of thousands of Russians of different nationalities into the
Gulag after the Great Purge that
took place in the 1930s. Labor
camps continued to play a signifi
cant role in the Soviet Union’s
industrialization. Gulag prisoners were used as a source of
infinite manpower to excavate the natural resources throughout
the vast nation.
Hitler’s concentration camps were
liberated after the collapse
of the Nazi regime. Stalin’s Gulags were widely shut down
after his death in 1953, but the
successors to the Soviet regime
continued to use the camps to suppress political dissidents.
Only in the late 1980s did Gorbachev finally close the Gulag’s
forced labor camps, making the word
gulag
a historical term.
The world has made a point in remembering the Nazi
concentration camps, the Soviet Gulag, and has paid extensive
attention to the people currently suffering in North Korean
labor camps. However the international community has paid
much less notice to the repressi
ve mechanism of the Chinese
regime–the Laogai. It was not until 1992, when Harry Wu
published his first book,
Laogai: The Chinese Gulag,
that the
world was alerted to the horrors of the Laogai. As a response to
the increased international attention, especially the
comparisons between the Laogai an
d the Soviet Gulag, China’s
government took the unusual step of issuing an official
White
Paper
. The report defended the Laogai as a regular prison
system for detaining, punishing, and reforming convicted
criminals, no different from other systems in the world. The
report even contended that the
Laogai could serve as a useful
model for other countries seeking to transform bad elements
into productive citizens.
The Chinese word
Laogai
, meaning “reform through labor,”
refers to a system of forced labor camps that spans China’s
territory–from the highly industri
alized prison factories of the
eastern coastal cities to the isolated, fenceless farms of the
West. And while Chinese officials and others tout the so-called
“legal reforms” that are bein
g carried out in the market
economy dominating China today, these reforms have not
brought about real changes to the Laogai system, and the
camps are more prevalent than ever.
An examination of the Laogai
in both theory and practice
reveals a system that is fundamentally different than other
systems of crime and punishment. Regardless of the Chinese
government’s claims that conditions have improved in the
Laogai and the Chinese judicial
system, the ideology behind
the institution is the same.
The persistence of totalitarian power in China pre-determines
certain distinctions of its
prison system according to the

Introduction
6
Communist Party:
The nature of the prison is determined by the
nature of state power. Ours is a socialist state
exercising the democratic dictatorship of the
people. As one of the tools of the people’s
democratic dictatorship, our Laogai facilities,
representing the working class and the working
people of our country, exercise dictatorship over a
minority of elements who are hostile to socialism,
thus safeguarding our socialist system.
5
In keeping with the role of protecting the so-called “people’s
democratic dictatorship”, the Laogai takes on a political
function. The purpose of the Laogai is not simply to punish
criminals in accordance
with the law, but to further strengthen
the dictatorship of the Communist Party by suppressing dissent.
CCP policies admit to this practice:
Our
Laogaidui
system constitutes an important
part of our public security system, and is one of
the tools of the dictatorship of the proletariat; it
serves to punish and reform all counter-
revolutionaries and other criminals.
6
5
Criminal Reform Handbook
PRC Ministry of Justice, Laogai
Bureau, Shaanxi People’s Publishers, 1988 p 3.
6
Laodong gaizao gongzuo
(Labor
Reform
Work)
, Beijing: CCP
internal document, 1985.
In the fifty years since the creation of the Laogai, little of its
organizational structure has changed. The Laogai system,
despite minor modifications in regulations, is still governed by
the same directives that were
issued under Mao. These policies
have led to three distinct categories of incarceration: Convict
Labor Reform (Laogai), Reeducation through Labor (Laojiao),
Forced Job Placement (Jiuye), and five sub-categories:
detention centers, custody and repatriation, shelter and
investigation, juvenile offender camps, and psychiatric
hospitals.
Today the Laogai system is thriving and an unknown number
of people continue to suffer in 1,045 camps. While many are
incarcerated for ordinary crimes,
others are convicted of crimes
that are political in nature, such as “endangering state and
public security” or “revealing st
ate secrets”. These crimes are
so broadly defined that essentially authorities can arrest almost
anyone.
In addition the general lack of due process in the Chinese legal
system victimizes countless indi
viduals. An increasing number
of citizens are in need of legal counsel, but only a few can
afford the high lawyer’s fees. Ma
ny people are often convicted
and sentenced without a trial, and
even if one is held they are
often refused the right to adequa
tely defend themselves, or are
convicted with false “evidence”.
For example on August 24,
2006 the blind human rights activist Chen Guangcheng was
found guilty of “gathering a crowd to disrupt traffic” and
damaging property. Just before the trial, a group of “unknown
people” accused Chen’s lawyers of pick-pocketing. As a result,

Introduction
7
they were held by police overnight and could not attend Chen’s
trial. Chen’s lawyers were only
released after his trial ended,
and Chen was forced to use court-appointed attorneys
.
7
Legal reforms beginning in 1978 and continuing into the 1990s
did occur in the judicial field. Hundreds of laws and regulations
were reviewed and new laws were made addressing arbitration,
notarization, and attorneys. Th
eoretically, there are now more
managerial mechanisms than before, however the legal system
is still based on the principle of acting “in favor of the leading
role of the Communist Party”. R
ecent statistics can attest to the
unbalanced public and private le
gal situation in the country.
The number of judges in China increased from 130,000 in 2001
to 190,000 to 2005, while the number of lawyers increased
from 100,198 to only 110,000 in 2005.
8
According to the US
NGO Dui Hua Foundation, 99% of
those tried for the crime of
“endangering state security” are convicted.
9
In the past few years a group of elite lawyers have banded
together to protect the civil rights of many groups including
relocated urban inhabitants, dissidents, Falun Gong
practitioners, religious followers, etc. Among this group of
activists that challenge the Chinese judicial system is Gao
Zhisheng, Pu Zhiqiang, Fan Yafeng, Li Heping, Zhang Sizhi,
7
Maureen Fan, “Attorney for jailed Chinese activist cites
obstruction,”
Washington Post
31 Aug. 2006: A19.
8
com/news/n35371c16.html. Compare
the 2001 and 2005 statistics.
9
Congressional-Executive Commission on China Annual Report
2006: 47.
Xu Zhiyong, and Teng Biao. By taking on sensitive cases,
these lawyers risk their careers
and the safety of their families
to defend their clients and to defend human rights.
The following sections discuss the history and theory behind
the Laogai institution, its components and economy.
History of the Laogai
The concept of the Laogai was
not a Chinese innovation, but
originated in the Soviet Un
ion where the Communists had
already formed the Gu
lag. In 1950 China and the Soviet Union
signed a defense treaty that s
tipulated that the Soviet
government would aid China and assist in the development of
certain basic social institutions, including the penal system.
This tutelage helped to create a system that blended the tenets
of both Chinese and Soviet philosophies of reform through
labor and is the basis of the Laogai today.
10
Marxism-Leninism holds that the state is a machine of
violence, made up of the army, police, courts, prisons, and
other compulsory facilities, for one class to rule another. Mao
Zedong integrated this ideology into the Communist Party and
made the Laogai a key component of the state machine. Under
Mao’s direction and with help from Soviet experts, the CCP
began building its nationwide system of labor reform camps in
the 1950s. Similar to the Soviet Gulag, a primary purpose of
the Laogai system was to root out and isolate the vast numbers
10
Leong, Albert.
Gulag and Laogai.
Eugene: University of Oregon
Press, 1999.

Introduction
8
of political prisoners that resulted from the new regime’s
consolidation of power:
Ours is a socialist state. A socialist state’s Laogai
facilities,…as an importa
nt component of the
people’s democratic dictat
orship, Laogai facilities
of all levels are established- prisons, Laogai
camps, Laojiao camps, an
d juvenile criminal
camps, all of them are tools representing the
interests of the proletariat and the masses
exercising dictatorship over a minority of hostile
elements originating from exploiter classes.
11
The term “hostile elements” referred to the ever-changing
targets of political campaigns launched by China’s newly
formed Communist government, including the members and
supporters of Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government and
“class enemies” such as landlords and wealthy businessmen,
often labeled “historical counterrevolutionaries.” Subsequent
purges from within the CCP further swelled the Laogai
population, filling the camps w
ith “rightists” and “leftists”
alike, depending on the shifting political winds.
Mao Zedong immediately recognized prisoners as a huge
source of manpower, and added an amendment to the
“Resolution of the Third National Public Security Conference”,
in 1951:
11
Deng Yuzhen. Southwest Law Sc
hool Law Publishing House, 1987,
p. 41-2, 45-6. Approved by the Laogai Bureau of the Ministry of
Justice.
The large number of people who are serving their
sentences is an enormous
source of labor. In order
to reform them, in order to solve the problems of
the prisons, in order
that these sentenced
counterrevolutionaries will
not just sit there and be
fed for nothing, we should begin to organize our
Laogai work. In the areas where this work already
exists, it should be expanded.
12
During the early years of the La
ogai, inmates were the primary
labor force for massive state-ru
n reconstruction projects that
would have been impossible to undertake with regular workers.
Millions of prisoners worked on irrigation, mining and dam
building projects that were ca
rried out during the Great Leap
Forward at the end of the 1950s
. Most of these projects took
place in the more remote provinces, such as Gansu, Guizhou,
Xinjiang and Tibet. Prisoners in these areas were forced to
reclaim wastelands and to unearth
dangerous mines. As a result
of treacherous conditions combined with the famine caused by
the Great Leap forward policies, hundreds of thousands of
inmates perished in prisons during this time.
13
According to a handful of survivor testimonies, during its
earlier years the Laogai system
experimented with prisoner
12
Sun Xiaoli, Zhongguo laodong gaizao zhidu de lilun yu shijian (
The
Theory and Practice of the Chinese Laogai System
). Beijing:
Zhongguo zhengfa daxue chubanshe, 1994, p. 21.
13
Jasper Becker.
Hungry Ghosts: Mao’s Secret Famine
. New York:
Henry Holt and Co. 1996.

Introduction
9
performance troupes. Prisoners who were musically or
artistically talented and were not considered violent (meaning
mostly political prisoners) were assigned to groups who would
travel to other prisons and to meetings of Party officials where
they would perform. Their performances generally featured
songs that extolled the praises of Chairman Mao and operas
depicting the liberation of the Chinese people through the
Communist Party. According to testimony gathered by the
Laogai Research Foundation,
these groups included opera
singers, orchestras, musicians of traditional Chinese music and
actors and actresses.
14
Gulag researchers report that these
performing groups also existed in the Soviet Union, and they
even claim that these prisoners helped to maintain certain
cultural and artistic traditions of the Russian people.
15
While
there is no research claiming
that prisoner performing troupes
in China in any way developed native Chinese culture (on the
contrary, their purpose was to promote Communist and more
specifically Maoist doctrine), we
know that most prisoners in
these groups were treated well and were not forced to labor as
other prisoners in the Laogai system.
14
See
Difficult Years
by
Wenche He’en, Wash
ington, D.C.: Laogai
Research Foundation
Black Series
, 2004. Author Wenche He’en
was born into a prominent Manchurian family. After graduating
from a Shanghai acting college he was falsely denounced as a
rightist in 1958 and spent nearly 20 years in the Laogai. His
autobiography tells how, as a pr
isoner, he was designated to
organize a theater group that gave
performances for the prisoners
and wardens.
15
Leong, Albert.
Gulag and Laogai
. Eugene: University of Oregon
Press, 1999.
The quasi-legal basis for the Laogai was established in the
1954 “Regulations on Reform through Labor.”
16
These
regulations were further developed in the 1954 “Temporary
Disciplinary Methods for the Release of Criminals Completing
their Terms and for the Implementation of Forced Job
Placement,” and the 1957 “Reeducation through Labor
Policies,” which was amended in 1979 with the
“Supplementary Reeducation through Labor Regulations.”
17
Thus the three primary institutions of the Laogai were
established: Laogai camps, Forced Job Placement, and Laojiao
(reeducation through labor) Camps.
Throughout the early Communist period, China remained a
nation with virtually no organized legal system. Chinese courts
functioned as an arm of the Party, using numerous documents
and directives from Mao Zedong and other top leaders to
maintain their power monopoly. As a popular saying in
mainland China goes, “policy is better than law, and leadership
is better than law, and leadership is better than policy.”
18
It was
not until after Mao Zedong’s death and Deng Xiaoping’s
subsequent “opening” of China that the nation was forced to
begin the task of developing some semblance of a legal system.
Because the reasoning for China’s opening was motivated more
by a desire to improve economic
development than to achieve
any development in the political system, the majority of laws
written related to economics and business, and only a few laws
16
See appendix: Official Legislative Documents P.
17
g/news2/newsdetail.php?id=265.
18
Ibid.

Introduction
10
were relevant to the prison system. Among these, the
Criminal
Law of the PRC
was among the most important. Signed into
law in 1979, this law included guidelines on Laogai ideology,
crime and punishment, the death penalty, and three different
categories of political offenses. These categories include the
following: crimes of counterrevolution, crimes of endangering
public security, and crimes of disrupting the order of social
administration. The law defines “counterrevolutionary crimes”
as the following:
All acts endangering th
e People’s Republic of
China committed with the goal of over-throwing
the political power of the dictatorship of the
proletariat and the socialist system.
19
The 1979 law code was also accompanied by a new code on
criminal procedures specifying how cases were to be
investigated and adjudicat
ed according to the law.
Deng Xiaoping, labeled the pragmatist, rehabilitated hundreds
of thousands of so-called counterrevolutionaries, ending mass
purges. Although many people thought the years of horror had
passed Deng continued to justify suppressing political
dissidents:
Under the present conditions, using the
suppressive force of our nation to attack and
disintegrate all types of
counter-revolutionary bad
19
The Criminal Law and the Crimi
nal Procedural Law of China.
Article 90, Beijing: Foreign La
nguage Press, 1984, p. 35-38.
elements, anti-party anti-socialist elements and
serious criminal offenders in order to preserve
public security is entirely in accord with the
demands of the people a
nd with the demands of
socialist modernization construction.
20
The CCP, to this day, is no more tolerant of dissent. Beginning
with the brutal crackdown on
those who participated in the
Democracy Wall Movement of 1979, Deng set the rules for
Chinese political life in the post-Mao era. Authorities often do
not think twice about suspending the legal guarantees that are
codified in the nation’s constitution and laws. Against a
backdrop of modernization and reform in Chinese corporate
law, dissidents are still detained illegally, deprived of legal
representation, tortured, forced to labor and have their
sentences extended for political reasons. In short, they remain
the victims of a regime that does not respect the rule of law.
Thus even as China moves towards further economic
integration with the international community, the Chinese
prison camp system retains its political function. According to
the Chinese government’s
Criminal Reform Handbook
(approved by the Laogai Bureau
of the Ministry of Justice in
1988):
The nature of the prison as a tool of the
dictatorship of classes is determined by the nature
20
Deng Xiaoping Xuanji
(Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping).
Beijing: People’s Press, Marc
h 30, 1979, p. 87, 155, 333.

Introduction
11
of state power. The nature
of our Laogai facilities,
which are a tool of the people’s democratic
dictatorship for punishing and reforming
criminals, is inevitably determined by the nature
of our socialist state, which exercises ‘The
People’s Democratic Dictatorship.’ The
fundamental task of our
Laogai facilities is
punishing and reforming crim
inals. To define their
functions concretely, they fulfill tasks in the
following three fields: 1. Punishing criminals and
putting them under surveillance. 2. Reforming
criminals. 3. Organizing criminals in labor and
production, thus creating wealth for society. Our
Laogai facilities are both fa
cilities of dictatorship
and special enterprises.
21
Several more legal reforms came in the 1990s, the most
significant of these being the revised Criminal Code of 1997
and the Criminal Procedure Code of 1997. These two codes
brought changes to certain provisions from the 1979 versions,
although such alterations in language resulted in little progress
in practice. For example, in th
e new law, the section from the
1979 law that was entitled “counterrevolutionary crimes” was
renamed “crimes against state s
ecurity,” and the previously
stated definition of counterrevolutionary laws was deleted from
the provisions, and the list of political crimes remains within
the law with few changes from its previous version. Far from
21
Criminal Reform Handbook
PRC Ministry of Justice, Laogai
Bureau, Shaanxi People’s Publishers, 1988.
indicating that activities previously considered
“counterrevolutionary crimes” are now legal, this omission
expands the scope of punishable acts to all those which fit the
vague, undefined notion of “en
dangering state security.”
Additionally, both the 1979 and 1997 versions of the
Criminal
Procedure Code
included provisions for protection of rights to
due process and to appeal in what appears on paper to be a law-
abiding system of crime and punishment.
22
Reports of human rights groups, governments and multi-lateral
organizations everywhere document China’s continuing failure
to protect rights of due process
for its citizens.
In recent years,
many reports have even stat
ed that circumstances have
deteriorated as China has carri
ed out crackdowns on groups
such as Falun Gong, the China
Democracy Party, and Internet
authors who Communist authorities feel pose a threat to their
power. The government has also
recently cracked down on the
large numbers of petitioners who have flocked to Beijing to
seek justice for the loss of property due to construction
projects, as well as for unfair employment practices and other
grievances.
23
22
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights.
Opening to Reform? An
Analysis of China’s Revise
d Criminal Procedure Law
. New York:
Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 1996.
23
See 2005 and 2006 reports from th
e U.S. State Department,
Amnesty International, Human Rights in China, the Laogai
Research Foundation and the
Guancha website
, www. guancha.org
in Chinese, http://www.cicus.org in E
nglish, published by the China
Information Center.

Introduction
12
Since the 1980’s, the Chines
e Communist Party (CCP) has
changed its focus from Marxist ideology to economic
advancement, and the Chinese pe
ople do enjoy more social
rights than they did thirty years ago. However they are still
denied fundamental political rights such as the freedoms of
speech, press, assembly, and association because the CCP
believes that political stability is the key to development.
Therefore the underlying rationale for China’s forced labor
camps remains political necessity. The primary purpose of the
Laogai is not simply to maintain order in society or to punish
criminals in accordance with the
law, but to protect and the
dictatorship of the CCP and to promote its policies. This is
carried out through two unique features of the Laogai–thought
reform and forced labor–aspects
that differentiate this system
from the Soviet Gulag.
Thought Reform
Beginning with the Communist takeover, thought reform
(sixiang gaizao) has been an intrinsic part of the Laogai system,
and is perhaps its most unique aspect. Premier Zhou Enlai
began the thought reform movement in China’s colleges and
universities. On September 29, 1951, drawing from personal
experience, Zhou gave a five hour-long speech at Beijing
University entitled “Regarding the reform of the intellectuals”,
stating that thought reform was the only way for intellectuals to
adjust to the new socialist China. After this speech, Mao
Zedong asserted that “thought reform, especially the thought
reform of the intellectuals, is one of the most important
conditions necessary to achieve real democratic reform and the
step-by-step industrialization of our nation.”
24
In contrast, the
Soviets never incorporated thought reform activities into the
Gulag system. One of the first public statements made
regarding this can be found in a
People’s Daily
editorial from
1954 outlining the basic penal philosophy of the CCP:
All crimes have definite
sociological roots. The
evil ideology and evil habits left behind by the old
society… still remain in the minds of some people
to a marked degree. Thus if we are to wipe all
crimes from their root, in addition to inflicting on
the criminal the punishment due, we must also
carry out various effective measures to transform
the various evil ideological conceptions in the
minds of the people so that they may be educated
and reformed into new people.
25
Under Mao, attempts were made to thoroughly remold those
criminals with “exploiting class origins” into “new socialist
24
See Xiao Shu, “Tianma de zhong
jie– zhishi fenzi sixiang gaizao
yundong shuiwei ” (
The end of a heavenly horse- Some details
about the thought reform movement of the intellectuals
),
25
“Reform through Labor of Criminals in Communist China,” Current
Background, No. 293, American C
onsulate General in Hong Kong,
September 15, 1954. Translated directly from an editorial in
People’s Daily
. Passage quoted in Robert Jay Lifton,
Thought
Reform and the Psychology of Totalism
(Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press) 1961.
………….clipped here……………………….

Document
s
505
NOTICE ISSUED BY MINISTRY OF FINANCE AND
NATIONAL REVE
NUE BUREAU
Re: Value-added Tax Collection Policy
for prison enterprises and RTLs
Issued date: 1998-04-20 Effective: 1998-04-20
All provinces, autonomous regi
ons, municipalities and cities
directly under the jurisdiction the Ministry of Finance Office of
State Tax Administration: In order to support the development
of prison enterprises and re-e
ducation through labor facilities,
the State Department ratified the Value-added Tax Collection
Policy. The regulations are as follows:
1.Value added tax cuts for prison enterprises are defined as:
inmates labor venues, and all property belonging to the
production units of the prison or RTL is controlled to the
Ministry of Justice Prison Administration and RTL Bureau of
each province (autonomous re
gions and municipalities).
In order to support the “separate the enterprise and prison
functions” reform, to comply with the above requirements, all
prison and RTL enterprises must use the existing productive
conditions to increase input for renovation and form new
production units. All property still belongs to the prison and
RTL facilities. The new unit can work closely with the former
enterprises for technology cooperation. The tax return policy
on this notice can then be applied.
2. The value-added tax return should be used mainly as
supplementary capital for the en
terprise, not to exceed 30%.
The proportion can be arranged by
consulting with the Ministry
of Justice Prison Authority and the RTL Bureau. Any value-
added tax produced by the workers in the newly formed
production units should be used only as capital.
3. Local financial supervisors shall follow the Caiyuzi No. 55
(1994) rule of the Ministry of Finance Department, National
Revenue Bureau, and the Chinese People’s Bank for tax return
regulations.
4. All enterprises that have been established for allocating the
family members of prisoners, and prison enterprises created by
foreign joint ventures with no official property rights are not
eligible for the value-added tax policy.
5. The enterprises under the Prison Administration of Xinjiang
Production and Construction Corps shall follow the same rule.
This policy shall be implemented beginning on January 1, 1998.
http://web.archive.org/web/20070316163112/http://www.laogai.org/news2/book/handbook05-06.pdf

Ex-Inmates Speak Out About Labor Camps As China Considers ‘Reforms’

February 22, 2013 3:20 AM
Some former prisoners of re-education through labor camps and their supporters hold signs in Beijing declaring, "No Re-education Through Labor." Popular opposition to the camps has grown as China's state-run media has highlighted particularly egregious cases.

Some former prisoners of re-education through labor camps and their supporters hold signs in Beijing declaring, “No Re-education Through Labor.” Popular opposition to the camps has grown as China’s state-run media has highlighted particularly egregious cases.

Frank Langfitt/NPR

Shen Lixiu’s story is numbingly familiar.

Officials in the eastern Chinese city of Nanjing knocked down her karaoke parlor for development. She says they then offered her compensation that was less than 20 percent of what she had invested in the place.

Shen complained to the central government. Local authorities responded by sentencing her to a “re-education through labor” camp for a year. Once inside, Shen says, camp workers tried to force her to accept the compensation.

“I refused to sign my name,” says Shen, 58, who has salt-and-pepper hair and wears a plum-colored, padded coat. “They beat me, knocked out my front teeth.”

Shen reaches up and removes a set of false teeth. Her mouth forms a ghoulish grin with a dark gap where her four front teeth were kicked out.

Shen Lixiu, 58, says she had her front teeth kicked out in a re-education through labor camp. She says authorities had her beaten so she would sign a compensation agreement for the government demolition of her karaoke parlor in Nanjing.

Frank Langfitt/NPR

She says fellow inmates beat her in exchange for reduced sentences — a practice human rights investigators say is common in these camps.

“Everyone went to sleep at night, not me,” Shen recalls. “They gave me a small stool, forcing me to stand on it. Once you fell to the ground, people would come to beat you. They asked drug addicts and prostitutes to beat you up.”

Those beatings proved effective. After seven months, Shen gave in. She signed the compensation agreement and was released, but she continues to protest what happened to her.

“I want to call on the leaders to abolish re-education through labor camps,” she says. “Inmates can no longer be tortured like this.”

‘Like Profit-Making Enterprises’

In January, the Chinese government announced it would “reform” the nation’s notorious re-education through labor camps. Under the current system, police can send people to the camps for years without trial, sometimes just for complaining about local officials.

“The system has drawn increasingly wide and fierce criticism from the public for years, and the need for reform is more necessary at present,” read a commentary in China’s state-run Xinhua news service last fall.

The government has yet to explain what reform would mean. However, the people who know the camps best — former inmates — say closing them is long overdue.

China’s Ministry of Justice says 160,000 people were imprisoned in 350 re-education through labor camps at the end of 2008.

Inmates include prostitutes, drug users and people like Shen, who have petitioned the central government to try to redress the wrongs of local officials.

Local authorities often use labor camps to shut up their critics with minimal paperwork.

“Local officials don’t want their dirty laundry to be aired in the open,” says Maya Wang, a Hong Kong-based researcher for Human Rights Watch. “The police control the process. They don’t have to go through the courts, and they don’t have to present any evidence.”

All they have to do is issue a document stating that an individual has disturbed social order, and that person can be sent to a camp for up to four years, Wang says. She adds, though, that actual sentences are shorter than they used to be and are now never more than two years.

The Communist Party built the labor camps in the 1950s to punish political enemies, including landlords and other capitalists. Today, the camps are driven by the same motives they were initially designed to punish.

“These re-education through labor facilities have become more like profit-making enterprises,” Wang says, “for the local government to basically have free labor that they could force to work for many hours a day to produce products at very low cost for domestic and international consumption.”

Desperate To Talk

Some former prisoners gathered recently at a dingy apartment buried among the alleys of south Beijing. They were so desperate to tell their stories that when a reporter arrived, they broke into applause.

The ex-inmates say they worked up to 16 hours a day making everything from circuit boards and uniforms to wire and blue jeans for little or no pay.

One of them, Tang Shuxiu, says she went to Beijing in 2011 to complain that her local government work unit hadn’t given her an apartment to which she thought she was entitled.

Police picked her up before she got out of the train station.

“They asked, ‘Are you here to petition?’ I said, ‘Yes,’ ” recalls Tang, who brought a mock-up of her labor camp identification card to pose with for photos so she can publicize the abuses of labor camps and push for change.

Tang, 51, says it never occurred to her to lie to the cops at the train station.

“I think petitioning doesn’t mean I am doing something bad or committing a crime,” she says. “I should tell the truth.”

Tang Shuxiu, 51, was sent to a re-education through labor camp in 2011 after she complained that her local government work unit failed to give her an apartment. She holds a mock-up of her labor camp ID card in order to publicize the abuses of labor camps and push for change.

Tang Shuxiu, 51, was sent to a re-education through labor camp in 2011 after she complained that her local government work unit failed to give her an apartment. She holds a mock-up of her labor camp ID card in order to publicize the abuses of labor camps and push for change.

Frank Langfitt/NPR

Like Tang, many petitioners are honest to their own detriment. Tang’s candor landed her in a labor camp in eastern China’s Jiangsu province for nearly a year. She says she spent more than 12 hours a day sewing the seams of blue jeans.

“When I first started making blue jeans, I worked slowly,” she recalls. “Our team leader smacked my hands with his shoes. He said, ‘These are all for export. You’ve got take it seriously.’ “

‘I Was Suffocating’

Tang was imprisoned for complaining about her housing. Sometimes, people are sent to labor camps for complaining about labor camps.

Hundreds of petitioners staged protests in Beijing during a visit by then-U.S. House Speaker Nancy Pelosi in 2009. Among them was Zhu Guiqin. Her brother had been put in a labor camp for alleged involvement in the banned spiritual group Falun Gong.

“On the day when Pelosi arrived, some petitioners and I tried to go to her event, and we were taken to the local police station,” Zhu says. Police sent her to a labor camp in Shenyang, a city in China’s frigid northeast.

Zhu is a wiry 49-year-old with a feisty personality who talks a blue streak. She says the guards eventually tired of her defiance and put her in solitary confinement — a tiny room with no bed.

“They confiscated my foam rubber mattress, saying, ‘This is not a hotel. Are you here to enjoy your life?’ ” Zhu recalls. “They dismantled the radiator and let me sleep on the floor.”

On winter nights, temperatures in Shenyang can drop below zero. Zhu wrapped up in a sweater, coats and quilts to stay warm. The room had no windows. Zhu says the air was awful.

“I couldn’t breathe. I was suffocating,” she says. “I lay on my stomach, facing the narrow space between the door and the floor to suck air from the outside.”

Murky Meaning Of ‘Reforms’

Stories like this have circulated on China’s Internet, driving public opposition to the camps. One of the most recent cases involved Tang Hui, a woman from south central China’s Hunan province. Tang was sent to a labor camp last year after criticizing police for trying to protect brothel operators who trafficked her 11-year-old daughter. The ensuing uproar on the Chinese equivalent of Twitter forced authorities to release Tang after just 10 days.

Wang Gongyi, a retired labor camp researcher with the Ministry of Justice, says the whole issue is way overblown. For one thing, he says petitioners only make up a tiny fraction of camp inmates. However, Wang does think the days of re-education through labor are numbered.

“I think it will probably be abolished, because the majority government people support abolition,” Wang says. “The core of the problem is decisions are made arbitrarily. The system doesn’t strictly follow legal procedure. Good people can be easily wronged.”

Wang adds that many camps have already stopped taking prisoners.

“Now, people are only coming out, not going in,” says Wang, “so the system only has 30,000 to 40,000 people.”

With official policy still unclear, though, some human rights activists are skeptical. Maya Wang of Human Rights Watch wonders if officials will stop sending petitioners to camps, only to house them in illegal black jails.

“What we fear is that one system is gone and another system crops up,” she says.

Labor camps still have one big group of supporters: China’s police. For them, giving up an authoritarian tool that has proven so convenient for so long would be a big step.

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International

In China, Not Everything Has Changed

February 24, 2013 5:04 AM

Shen Lixiu, 58, says she had her front teeth kicked out in a re-education through labor camp. Chinese authorities say they are considering “reforms” to a system that is coming under increasing public criticism.

Frank Langfitt/NPR

A lot of journalism about China focuses on the country’s rapid and stunning changes, but equally telling are the things that stay the same. I did my first story on China’s re-education through labor camps back in 2001.

I met a former inmate named Liu Xiaobo for lunch in Beijing. Liu, soft-spoken and thoughtful, had written an article mourning those who had died in the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown. He had also called for democracy.

So, one day, police took him from his house and charged him with “slandering the Communist Party” and “disrupting social order.”

“It took no more than an hour and a half for them to arrest me in my home, declare a sentence of three years in a re-education camp and send me to another detention center in suburban Beijing,” said Liu over cups of tea. “I never imagined they could use such a fast method. If I hadn’t gone to the toilet, it would have been even shorter.”

Not long after I talked to Liu, I left China. Liu continued his calls for political change, which landed him in prison.

In 2010, he won the Nobel Peace Prize.

I returned to China in 2011 as NPR’s Shanghai bureau chief. China was now the world’s second largest economy, Shanghai’s skyline dwarfed Manhattan’s, but police were still chucking people in labor camp with no due process.

This story that we broadcast and published Friday tells a familiar tale of people who complain about bad treatment by local government and end up in labor camps working 12- to 16-hour days and enduring beatings.

But, like so much else here, this too may be changing. With the growth of the Internet and a freer press, public opinion has been galvanized against the camps. The government says it wants to “reform” the system. Some think officials may even shut it down.

“I think it will probably be abolished, because the majority of government people support abolition,” said Wang Gongyi, a retired Ministry of Justice researcher. “The core problem is decisions are made arbitrarily. Good people can be easily wronged.”

Liu Xiaobo

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
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This article is about the human rights activist. For the taekwondo fighter, see Liu Xiaobo (taekwondo).
This article needs additional citations for verification. Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unsourced material may be challenged and removed. (February 2013)
This is a Chinese name; the family name is Liu (劉).
Liu Xiaobo 劉曉波
Born 28 December 1955 (age 57)
Changchun, Jilin
Nationality Chinese
Alma mater Jilin University
Beijing Normal University
Occupation Writer, political commentator, human rights activist
Spouse(s) Liu Xia
Awards 2010 Nobel Peace Prize
Liu Xiaobo
Simplified Chinese 刘晓波
Traditional Chinese 劉曉波
[show]Transcriptions
This article contains Chinese text. Without proper rendering support, you may see question marks, boxes, or other symbols instead of Chinese characters.

Liu Xiaobo (Chinese: 刘晓波) (born 28 December 1955)[1] is a Chinese literary critic, writer, professor, and human rights activist who called for political reforms and the end of communist single-party rule.[2] He is currently incarcerated as a political prisoner in Jinzhou, Liaoning.[3][4][5]

Liu has served from 2003 to 2007 as President of the Independent Chinese PEN Center, an organization funded by the National Endowment for Democracy,[6] which in turn is almost entirely funded by the US Congress. He was also the President of NED-funded MinZhuZhongGuo (Democratic China) magazine since the mid-1990s. On 8 December 2008, Liu was detained because of his participation with the Charter 08 manifesto. He was formally arrested on 23 June 2009 on suspicion of “inciting subversion of state power.”[7][8] He was tried on the same charges on 23 December 2009,[9] and sentenced to eleven years’ imprisonment and two years’ deprivation of political rights on 25 December 2009.[10]

During his fourth prison term, he was awarded the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize for “his long and non-violent struggle for fundamental human rights in China.”[11][12][13][14] He is the first Chinese citizen to be awarded a Nobel Prize of any kind while residing in China.[15] Liu is the third person to be awarded the Nobel Peace Prize while in prison or detention, after Germany’s Carl von Ossietzky (1935) and Burma’s Aung San Suu Kyi (1991).[16] Liu is also the second person (the first being Ossietzky) to be denied the right to have a representative collect the Nobel prize for him.

Contents

Early life and works

Liu was born in Changchun, Jilin, in 1955 to an intellectual family. In 1969, during the Down to the Countryside Movement, Liu’s father took him to Horqin Right Front Banner, Inner Mongolia. After he finished middle school in 1974, he was sent to the countryside to work on a farm in Jilin.

In 1977, Liu was admitted to the Department of Chinese Literature at Jilin University, where he created a poetry group known as “The Innocent Hearts” (Chi Zi Xin) with six schoolmates.[17] In 1982, he graduated with B.A. in literature before being admitted as a research student at the Department of Chinese Literature at Beijing Normal University. In 1984, he received an M.A. in literature and became a teacher at the same department.[18][19][20] That year, he married Tao Li, with whom he had a son named Liu Tao in 1985.

In 1986, Liu started his doctoral study program and published his literary critiques at various magazines. He became well known as a “dark horse” for his radical opinions and sharp comments on the official doctrines and establishments to shock both of the literary and ideological circles, thus termed as “Liu Xiaobo Shock” or “Liu Xiaobo Phenomenon”.[21] In 1987, his first book, Criticism of the Choice: Dialogues with Li Zehou, was published and became a bestseller non-fiction.[21] It comprehensively criticised the Chinese tradition of Confucianism and posed a frank challenge to Li Zehou, a rising ideological star who had a strong influence on young intellectuals in China at the time.[21]

In June 1988, he received a Ph.D. in literature. His doctoral thesis, Aesthetic and Human Freedom, passed the examination unanimously and was published as his second book.[22] In the same year he became a lecturer at the same department. He soon became a visiting scholar at several universities, including Columbia University, the University of Oslo, and the University of Hawaii. He returned home as the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests broke out. This year saw also the publication of his third book, The Fog of Metaphysics, a comprehensive review on Western philosophies. Soon, all of his works were banned.[citation needed]

Political views

In a 1988 interview with Hong Kong’s Liberation Monthly (now known as Open Magazine), Liu was asked what it would take for China to realize a true historical transformation. He replied:

“[It would take] 300 years of colonialism. In 100 years of colonialism, Hong Kong has changed to what we see today. With China being so big, of course it would require 300 years as a colony for it to be able to transform into how Hong Kong is today. I have my doubts as to whether 300 years would be enough.”[23][24]

Liu admitted in 2006 that the response was extemporaneous, although he did not intend to take it back, as it represented “an extreme expression of his longheld belief.”[24] The quote was nonetheless used against him. He has commented, “Even today [in 2006], radical patriotic ‘angry youth‘ still frequently use these words to paint me with ‘treason‘.”[24]

Known for his pro-West stance, Liu once stated in an interview: “Modernization means whole-sale westernization, choosing a human life is choosing Western way of life. Difference between Western and Chinese governing system is humane vs in-humane, there’s no middle ground… Westernization is not a choice of a nation, but a choice for the human race” [25]

During the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests, he was in the United States but decided to return to China to join the movement. He was later named as one of the “four junzis of Tiananmen Square” for persuading students to leave the square and thus saving hundreds of lives.[26]

As noted by Simon Leys of the New York Review of Books in an article about Liu Xiaobo, while traveling in the United States and Europe, Liu’s perception of the West and its relationship to a modernizing China, evolved.[27]

“During a visit to the Metropolitan Museum in New York, he experienced a sort of epiphany that crystallized the turmoil of his latest self-questioning: he realized the shallowness of his own learning in the light of the fabulous riches of the diverse civilizations of the past, and simultaneously perceived the inadequacy of contemporary Western answers to mankind’s modern predicament. His own dream that Westernization could be used to reform China suddenly appeared to him as pathetic as the attitude of ‘a paraplegic laughing at a quadriplegic,’ he confessed at the time: ‘My tendency to idealize Western civilization arises from my nationalistic desire to use the West in order to reform China. But this has led me to overlook the flaws of Western culture…. I have been obsequious toward Western civilization, exaggerating its merits, and at the same time exaggerating my own merits. I have viewed the West as if it were not only the salvation of China but also the natural and ultimate destination of all humanity. Moreover I have used this delusional idealism to assign myself the role of savior…. I now realize that Western civilization, while it can be useful in reforming China in its present stage, cannot save humanity in an overall sense. If we stand back from Western civilization for a moment, we can see that it possesses all the flaws of humanity in general….If I, as a person who has lived under China’s autocratic system for more than thirty years, want to reflect on the fate of humanity or how to be an authentic person, I have no choice but to carry out two critiques simultaneously. I must: 1. Use Western civilization as a tool to critique China. 2. Use my own creativity to critique the West.’”[27]

In his 1996 article titled “Lessons from the Cold War”, Liu argues that “The free world led by the US fought almost all regimes that trampled on human rights … The major wars that the US became involved in are all ethically defensible.” He has defended U.S. policies in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, which he thinks is the fault of the “provocateur” Palestinians.[28]

Liu also published a 2004 article in support of Bush’s war on Iraq, titled “Victory to the Anglo-American Freedom Alliance”, in which he praised the U.S.-led post-Cold War conflicts as “best examples of how war should be conducted in a modern civilization.” He predicted “a free, democratic and peaceful Iraq will emerge.”[29] During the 2004 US presidential election, Liu again praised Bush for his war effort against Iraq and condemned Democratic Party candidate John Kerry for not sufficiently supporting the wars in which the U.S. was then involved. He commented on Islamism that, “a cul­ture and (reli­gious) sys­tem that pro­duced this kind of threat (Islamic fundamentalism), must be extremely intol­er­ant and blood-thirsty.” On Israel, he said “with­out America’s pro­tec­tion, the long per­se­cuted Jews who faced exter­mi­na­tion dur­ing World War II, prob­a­bly would again be drowned by the Islamic world’s hatred.”[28][30]

Human rights activities

On 27 April 1989, Liu returned to Beijing and immediately and actively supported the popular movement. When the army looked set to violently eject the students who persistently occupied the square to challenge the government and army enforcing martial law in Tiananmen Square, he initiated a four-man three-day hunger strike on 2 June. Later referred to as the “Tiananmen Four Gentlemen Hunger Strike”, the action earned the trust of the students. He requested that the government and the students abandon the ideology of class struggle and adopt a new kind of political culture of dialogue and compromise. Although it was too late to prevent the massacre from occurring beyond the square starting from the night of 3 June, he and his colleagues successfully negotiated with the student leaders and the army commander to let all of the several thousand students withdraw peacefully from the Square, thus avoiding a possibly much larger scale of bloodshed.[citation needed]

On 6 June, Liu was arrested and detained in Qincheng Prison for his alleged role in the movement, and three months later was expelled from Beijing Normal University. The government’s media issued numerous publications which labeled him a “mad dog” and “black hand” because he had allegedly incited and manipulated the student movement to overthrow the government and socialism. His publications were banned, including his fourth book in press, Going Naked Toward God. In Taiwan however, his first and third books, Criticism of the Choice: Dialogues with Leading Thinker LI Zehou (1989), and the two-volume Mysteries of Thought and Dreams of Mankind (1990) were republished with some additions.[citation needed]

In January 1991, 19 months since his arrest, Liu Xiaobo was convicted for the offense of “counter-revolutionary propaganda and incitement”[10] but exempted from criminal punishment for his “major meritorious action” for having avoided the possible bloody confrontation in Tiananmen Square. After his release, he was divorced and eventually his ex-wife and son immigrated to the US. He resumed his writing, mostly on human rights and political issues though he has not been allowed to publish in Mainland China. In 1992, in Taiwan, he published his first book after his imprisonment, The Monologues of a Doomsday’s Survivor, a controversial memoir with his confessions and political criticism on the popular movement in 1989.

In January 1993, Liu was invited to visit Australia and the US for the interviews in the documentary film Gate of Heavenly Peace. Although many of his friends suggested that he take refuge abroad, Liu returned to China in May 1993 and continued his freelance writing.[citation needed]

On 18 May of 1995, the police took Liu into custody for launching a petition campaign on the eve of the sixth anniversary of the 4 June massacre, calling on the government to reassess the event and to initiate political reform. He was held under residential surveillance in the suburbs of Beijing for 9 months. He was released in February 1996 but arrested again on 8 October for an October Tenth Declaration, co-authored by him and another prominent dissident Wang Xizhe, mainly on the Taiwan issue that advocated a peaceful reunification in order to oppose the Chinese Communist Party’s forceful treats towards the island. He was ordered to serve three years of re-education through labor[10][31] “for disturbing public order” for that statement.[32] In the same year, he married Liu Xia.

After his release on 7 October 1999, Liu Xiaobo resumed his freelance writing. However, it is reported[33] that the government built a sentry station next to his home and his phone calls and internet connections were tapped.

In 2000, he published in Taiwan the book A Nation That Lies to Conscience, a 400-paged political criticism. Also published, in Hong Kong, was Selection of Poems, a 450-paged collection of the poems as correspondences between him and his wife during his imprisonment; it was co-authored by Liu and his wife. The last of three books which he published during the year was in Mainland China, titled The Beauty Offers Me Drug: Literary Dialogues between Wang Shuo and Lao Xia, a 250-paged collection of literary critiques co-authored by a popular young writer and by himself under his unknown penname of “Lao Xiao”. In the same year, Liu participated in founding the Independent Chinese PEN Centre and was elected to its board of directors as well as its president in November 2003, re-elected two years later. In 2007, he did not seek for the re-election of the president but held his position of the board member until detained by the police in December 2008.

In 2004, when he started to write a Human Rights Report of China at home, his computer, letters and documents were confiscated by the government. He once said, “at Liu Xia’s [Liu's wife] birthday, her best friend brought two bottles of wine to [my home] but was blocked by the police from coming in. I ordered a [birthday] cake and the police also rejected the man who delivered the cake to us. I quarreled with them and the police said, “it is for the sake of your security. It has happened many bomb attacks in these days.”[33] Those measures were loosened until 2007, prior to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games.[33]

In January 2005, following the death of former Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang, who showed sympathy to protesters of the student demonstration in 1989, Liu was immediately put under house arrest for two weeks before realizing the death of Zhao.[34] In the same year, he published two more books in the US, The Future of Free China Exists in Civil Society, and Single-Blade Poisonous Sword: Criticism of Chinese Nationalism.

His writing is considered subversive by the Chinese Communist Party, and his name is censored.[35] He has called for multi-party elections, free markets, advocated the values of freedom, supported separation of powers and urged the governments to be accountable for its wrongdoings.[36] When not in prison, he has been the subject of government monitoring and put under house arrest during sensitive times.[33]

Liu’s human rights work has received international recognition. In 2004, Reporters Without Borders awarded him the Fondation de France Prize as a defender of press freedom.[37]

Prison terms for Liu Xiaobo[38]
Prison term Reason Result
June 1989 – January 1991 Charged with spreading messages to instigate counterrevolutionary behavior. Imprisoned in one of China’s best-known maximum security prisons, Qincheng Prison, and discharged when he signed a “letter of repentance.”
May 1995 – January 1996 Being involved in democracy and human rights movement and voicing publicly the need to redress the government’s wrongdoings in the student protest of 1989 Released after being jailed for six months.
October 1996 – October 1999 Charged with disturbing the social order Jailed in a labor education camp for three years. In 1996, he married Liu Xia.
December 2009 – 2020 Charged with spreading a message to subvert the country and authority Sentenced for 11 years and deprived of all political rights for two years. Currently imprisoned in Jinzhou Prison in Liaoning Province.[39]

Charter 08, arrest and trial

Conception and diffusion of the Charter

Main article: Charter 08

Political protest in Hong Kong against the detention of Liu Xiaobo

Liu Xiaobo actively participated in the writing of and, along with more than three hundred Chinese citizens, signed Charter 08. The Charter is a manifesto released on 10 December 2008 to coincide with the 60th anniversary of the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It was written in the style of the Czechoslovak Charter 77, calling for more freedom of expression, human rights, more democratic elections, for privatizing state enterprises and land and for economic liberalism.[40] As of September 2010, the Charter has collected over 10,000 signatures.[41][42]

Arrest

Two days before the official release of the Charter, late in the evening of 8 December 2008, Liu was taken into custody by the police,[43] as was Zhang Zuhua, another scholar and Charter 08 signatory. According to Zhang, the two were detained on suspicion of gathering signatures to the Charter.[44] While Liu was detained in solitary confinement,[45] he was forbidden to meet with his lawyer or family, though he was allowed to eat lunch with his wife, Liu Xia, and two policemen on New Year’s Day 2009.[46] On 23 June 2009, the Beijing procuratorate approved Liu’s arrest on charges of “suspicion of inciting subversion of state power,” a crime under Article 105 of China’s Criminal Law.[47] In a Xinhua news release announcing Liu’s arrest, the Beijing Public Security Bureau alleged that Liu had incited the subversion of state power and the overturn of the socialist system through methods such as spreading rumors and slander, citing almost verbatim Article 105; the Beijing PSB also noted that Liu had “fully confessed.”[8]

Trial

On 1 December 2009, Beijing police transferred Liu’s case to the procuratorate for investigation and processing;[9] on 10 December, the procuratorate formally indicted Liu on charges of “inciting subversion of state power” under and sent his lawyers, Shang Baojun and Ding Xikui, the indictment document.[9] He was tried at Beijing No. 1 Intermediate Court on 23 December 2009. His wife was not permitted to observe the hearing, although his brother-in-law was present.[9][48][49] Diplomats from more than a dozen states – including the U.S., Britain, Canada, Sweden, Australia and New Zealand – were denied access to the court to watch the trial and stood outside the court for its duration.[50] Amongst these included Gregory May, political officer at the U.S. Embassy, and Nicholas Weeks, first secretary of the Swedish Embassy.[51]

I have no enemies, and no hatred. None of the police who have monitored, arrested and interrogated me, the prosecutors who prosecuted me, or the judges who sentence me, are my enemies. While I’m unable to accept your surveillance, arrest, prosecution or sentencing, I respect your professions and personalities, including Zhang Rongge and Pan Xueqing who act for the prosecution at present. I was aware of your respect and sincerity in your interrogation of me on December 3.For hatred is corrosive of a person’s wisdom and conscience; the mentality of enmity can poison a nation’s spirit, instigate brutal life and death struggles, destroy a society’s tolerance and humanity, and block a nation’s progress to freedom and democracy. I hope therefore to be able to transcend my personal vicissitudes in understanding the development of the state and changes in society, to counter the hostility of the regime with the best of intentions, and defuse hate with love….I do not feel guilty for following my constitutional right to freedom of expression, for fulfilling my social responsibility as a Chinese citizen. Even if accused of it, I would have no complaints.
—Liu Xiaobo, 23 December 2009[52]

This statement, titled “I have no enemies“, was later read in the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize ceremony, which Liu was unable to attend due to imprisonment.[53] On 25 December 2009, Liu was sentenced to eleven years’ imprisonment and two years’ deprivation of political rights by the Beijing No. 2 Intermediate Court on charges of “inciting subversion of state power.” According to Liu’s family and counsel, he plans to appeal the judgment.[10] In the verdict, Charter 08 was named as part of the evidence supporting his conviction.[10] John Pomfret of The Washington Post said Christmas Day was chosen to dump the news because the Chinese government believed Westerners were less likely to take notice on a holiday.[54]

China’s political reform [...] should be gradual, peaceful, orderly and controllable and should be interactive, from above to below and from below to above. This way causes the least cost and leads to the most effective result. I know the basic principles of political change, that orderly and controllable social change is better than one which is chaotic and out of control. The order of a bad government is better than the chaos of anarchy. So I oppose systems of government that are dictatorships or monopolies. This is not ‘inciting subversion of state power’. Opposition is not equivalent to subversion.
—Liu Xiaobo, 9 February 2010[55]

In an article published in the South China Morning Post, Liu argued that his verdict violated China’s constitution, and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of the United Nations. He argued that charges against him of ‘spreading rumours, slandering and in other ways inciting the subversion of the government and overturning the socialist system’ were contrived, as he did not fabricate or create false information, nor did he besmirch the good name and character of others by merely expressing a point of view, a value judgment.[55]

International response

Japanese demonstrators hoisted sign written the words “Free Liu Xiaobo” near Chinese Embassy in Tokyo on 16 October 2010.

Polish mural in Warsaw, reading “Solidarity with Liu Xiaobo”

Liu’s detention was condemned worldwide by organisations and other countries. On 11 December 2008, the U.S. Department of State called for Liu’s release,[56] which was followed on 22 December 2008 by a similar request from a consortium of scholars, writers, lawyers and human rights advocates.[57] Additionally, on 21 January 2009, 300 international writers, including Salman Rushdie, Margaret Atwood, Ha Jin and Jung Chang, called for Liu’s release in a statement put out through PEN.[46] In March 2009, the One World Film Festival awarded Liu Xiaobo the Homo Homini Award, organized by the People in Need foundation, for promoting freedom of speech, democratic principles and human rights.[58]

In December 2009, the European Union and United States issued formal appeals calling for the unconditional release of Liu Xiaobo.[59][60] China, responding to the international calls prior to the verdict, stated that other nations should “respect China’s judicial sovereignty and to not do things that will interfere in China’s internal affairs.”[61]

Responding to the verdict, United Nations Human Rights Commissioner Navanethem Pillay expressed concern at the deterioration of political rights in China.[62] German Chancellor Angela Merkel strongly criticized the verdict, stating “despite the great progress in other areas in the expression of views, I regret that the Chinese government still massively restricts press freedom.”[63] Canada and Switzerland also condemned the verdict.[64][65] The Republic of China President Ma Ying-jeou called on Beijing to “tolerate dissent”.[66] On 6 January 2010, former Czech president Václav Havel joined with other communist-era dissidents at the Chinese Embassy in Prague to present a petition calling for Liu’s release.[67] On 22 January 2010, European Association for Chinese Studies sent an open letter to Hu Jintao on behalf of over 800 scholars from 36 countries calling for Liu’s release.[68]

On 18 January 2010, Liu was nominated for the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize by Václav Havel, the 14th Dalai Lama, André Glucksmann, Vartan Gregorian, Mike Moore, Karel Schwarzenberg, Desmond Tutu and Grigory Yavlinsky.[69] China’s Foreign Ministry spokesperson Ma Zhaoxu stated that awarding the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu would be “totally wrong”.[70] Geir Lundestad, a secretary of the Nobel Committee, stated the award would not be influenced by Beijing’s opposition.[70] On 25 September 2010, The New York Times reported that a petition in support of the Nobel nomination was being circulated in China.[71]

On 14 September 2010, the Mayor of Reykjavík, Jón Gnarr, met on an unrelated matter with CPC Politburo member Liu Qi and demanded China set the dissident Liu Xiaobo free. Also that September Václav Havel, Dana Němcová and Václav Malý, leaders of Czechoslovakia’s Velvet Revolution, published an open letter in the International Herald Tribune calling for the award to be given to Liu, while a petition began to circulate soon afterwards.[71][72]

On 6 October 2010, the non-governmental organization Freedom Now, which serves as an international counsel to Liu Xiaobo as retained by his family, publicly released a letter from 30 members of the U.S. Congress to President Barack Obama, urging him to directly raise both Liu’s case and that of fellow imprisoned dissident Gao Zhisheng to Chinese President Hu Jintao at the G-20 Summit in November 2010.[73] The Republic of China President Ma Ying-jiu congratulated Liu on winning the Nobel Prize and requested Chinese authorities to improve their impression to the world about human rights, but not calling for his release from prison.[74]

In 2011, the WorldWideReading is dedicated to Liu Xiaobo; on 20 March, there were readings in more than 60 towns and cities on all continents and broadcast via radio stations. The appeal “Freedom for Liu Xiaobo” has so far been supported by more than 700 writers from around the world, amongst them the Nobel Prize laureates John M. Coetzee, Nadine Gordimer, Herta Müller and Elfriede Jelinek, as well as Breyten Breytenbach, Eliot Weinberger, Salman Rushdie, Vikram Seth, Mario Vargas Llosa, Wolf Biermann and Dave Eggers.

The international literature festival called for a worldwide reading on 20 March 2011 for Liu Xiaobo. More than 700 authors from all continents signed the appeal and over 150 institutions took part in the event. [75]

Nobel Peace Prize

Nobel Peace Prize Ceremony in Hong Kong on 10 December 2010.

On 8 October 2010, the Nobel Committee awarded Liu the Nobel Peace Prize “for his long and non-violent struggle for fundamental human rights in China,”[76] saying that Liu had long been front-runner as the recipient of the prize.[77]

China reacted negatively to the award, immediately censoring news about the announcement of the award in China, though later that day limited news of the award became available.[clarification needed] Foreign news broadcasters including CNN and the BBC were immediately blocked,[78] while heavy censorship was applied to personal communications.[79][80] The Chinese Foreign Ministry denounced the award to Liu Xiaobo, saying that it “runs completely counter to the principle of the award and is also a desecration of the Peace Prize.”[81][82][83][84] The Norwegian ambassador to the People’s Republic of China was summoned by the Foreign Ministry on 8 October 2010 and was presented with an official complaint about the granting of the Nobel Peace Prize to Liu.[85] The Chinese government has called Liu Xiaobo a criminal and stated that he does not deserve the prize. Chinese dissident Wei Jingsheng, in his response to news of the award, criticized Liu by calling him “the accomplice of the Communist regime.”[86]

Following the announcement of the Nobel Peace Prize, celebrations in China were either stopped or curtailed,[87] and prominent intellectuals and other dissidents were detained, harassed or put under surveillance;[88] Liu’s wife, Liu Xia, was placed under house arrest[89] and was forbidden to talk to reporters even though no official charges were brought.[90] Sixty-five countries with missions in Norway were all invited to the Nobel Prize ceremony, but fifteen declined, in some cases due to heavy lobbying by China. Besides China, these countries were Russia, Kazakhstan, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iraq, Iran, Vietnam, Venezuela, Egypt, Sudan, Cuba and Morocco.[91][92]

China also imposed travel restrictions on known dissidents ahead of the ceremony. A Chinese group announced that its answer to the Nobel Peace Prize, the Confucius Peace Prize, would be awarded to former Taiwan Vice-President Lien Chan for the bridge of peace he has been building between Taiwan and Mainland China.[93] Lien Chan himself denied any knowledge of the $15,000 prize.[94][95]

Major publications

  • Criticism of the Choice: Dialogues with LI Zehou[96]. Shanghai People’s Publishing House. 1987.
  • Criticism of the Choice: Dialogues with Leading Thinker LI Zehou[97]. Shanghai People’s Publishing House. 1989.
  • Aesthetics and Human Freedom[98]. Beijing Normal University Press. 1988.
  • Going Naked Toward God[99]. Time Literature and Art Publishing House. 1989.
  • The Fog of Metaphysics[100]. Shanghai People’s Publishing House. 1989.
  • Mysteries of Thought and Dreams of Mankind, 2 volumes[101]. Strom & Stress Publishing Company. 1989,1990.
  • Contemporary Politics and Intellectuals of China[102]. Tangshan Publishing Company, Taiwan. 1990.
  • Criticism on Contemporary Chinese Intellectuals (Japanese Translation)[103]. Tokuma Bookstore, Tokyo. 1992.
  • The Monologues of a Doomsday’s Survivor[104]. China Times Publishing Company, Taiwan. 1993.
  • Selected Poems of Liu Xiabo and Liu Xia[105]. Xiafei’er International Press, Hong Kong. 2000.
  • Under pen name Lao Xia and co-authored with Wang Shuo (2000). A Belle Gave me Knockout Drug[106]. Changjiang Literary Press.
  • A Nation That Lies to Conscience[107]. Jie-jou Publishing Company, Taiwan. 2002.
  • Civil Awakening—The Dawn of a Free China[108]. Laogai Research Foundation. 2005.
  • A Single Blade and Toxic Sword: Critique on Comtempory Chinese Nationalism[109]. Broad Press Inc, Sunnyvale. 2006.
  • Falling of A Great Power: Memorandum to China[110]. Yunchen Culture. 10 2009.
  • From TianAnMen Incident to Charter 08 (in Japanese ): Memorandum to China[111]. Fujiwara Bookstore, Tokyo. 12 2009.

Awards and Honors

  • Excellent Award (2004) for an article Corrupted News is not News, published on Open Magazine , January 2004 issue
  • Grand Prize (2005) for an article Paradise of the Powerful, Hell of the Vulnerable on Open Magazine, September 2004 issue
  • Excellent Award (2006) for The Causes and Ending of Shanwei Bloodshed on Open Magazine, January 2006

See also

References

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  96. ^ Original title:《选择的批判——与李泽厚对话》, published by 上海人民出版社
  97. ^ Original title:《选择的批判—与思想领袖李泽厚对话》, published by 台湾风云时代出版公司
  98. ^ Original title: 《审美与人的自由》, published by 北京師范大學出版社
  99. ^ Original title: 《赤身裸体,走向上帝》, 时代文艺出版社
  100. ^ Original title:《形而上学的迷雾》, by 上海人民出版社
  101. ^ Original title:《思想之谜与人类之梦》(二卷), by 台湾风云时代出版公司
  102. ^ Original title:《中国当代政治与中国知识份子》, published by 台北唐山出版社
  103. ^ Original title:現代中国知識人批判, published by 日本德间书店
  104. ^ Original title:《末日幸存者的独白》, published by 台湾中国时报出版社
  105. ^ 《刘晓波刘霞诗选》, published by 香港夏菲尔国际出版公司
  106. ^ Original title:《美人赠我蒙汗药》, by 长江文艺出版社
  107. ^ Original title: 《向良心说谎的民族》, published by 台湾捷幼出版社
  108. ^ Original title:《未来的自由中国在民间》, published by 劳改基金会
  109. ^ Original title:《单刃毒剑——中国当代民族主义批判》, published by 美国博大出版社
  110. ^ Original title:《大国沈沦—写给中国的备忘录》, published by 台北允晨文化出版社
  111. ^ Original title:《天安門事件から「08憲章」》, published by 日本藤原书店
  112. ^ One World Homo Homini award goes to Chinese dissident,2009年3月12日.
  113. ^ “Liu Xiaobo”. DW.de. 29 April 2009. Retrieved 29 April 2009.
  114. ^ Liu Xiaobo DW, 7 October 2010.
  115. ^ LIU XIAOBO’S NOBEL PEACE PRIZE WIN PUTS SPOTLIGHT ON CHINA RIGHTS VIOLATIONS Amnesty International [2010-10-08]

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Liu’s verdict and articles cited as evidence of Liu’s guilt in the verdict

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Awards and achievements
Preceded by
Barack Obama
Nobel Peace Prize Laureate
2010
Succeeded by
Ellen Johnson Sirleaf
Leymah Gbowee
Tawakel Karman
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2010 Nobel Prize laureates
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