
Council on Foreign Relations
Another Challenge to U.S.-Pakistan Ties
Interviewee: Daniel Markey, Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia
Interviewer: Jayshree Bajoria, Senior Staff Writer, CFR.org
July 21, 2011
What’s significant about it most is the timing. This comes on the heels of the arrest of the Pakistani doctor who assisted the U.S. operation in Abbottabad [targeting Osama bin Laden] and worked directly with the CIA in a variety of ways. So what you have inside of Pakistan is the arrest of a Pakistani national for assisting U.S. efforts. And now here in Washington, you have the arrest of an American citizen of Pakistani origin for his assistance [on] Pakistani efforts.
The similarities here are striking, and the fact that it comes in the midst of a crisis in the broader U.S.-Pakistan relationship will undoubtedly lead to questions in Pakistan as to whether this arrest and this case are being brought intentionally at this time to send a message to Islamabad.
How does the arrest affect broader ties and military-to-military and intelligence cooperation between the two countries?
The effect of the arrest is more likely to be incremental than it is to be significant, or a tipping point in the relationship. This is an individual who had some influence here in Washington, but by most accounts was not a significant threat. He was not a spy in the strict sense of the word–he was attempting to peddle influence, and it’s not even clear how influential he ultimately was. Without downplaying the significance of his actions, or suggesting that they might not have been illegal–it simply doesn’t rise to the sort of thing that would tip the scales one way or another in terms of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. That said, the relationship is on thin ice, and this event will make the ice thinner.
What message is Washington trying to send to Islamabad with this arrest?
Let’s be clear: I’m not sure that Washington is attempting to send a message. But the Pakistanis will see it as a message, and their perception will link these events quite clearly. That may or may not have been the U.S. government’s intention; it’s not always the case that the FBI, the CIA, the State Department, and the White House coordinate in seamless ways to produce these outcomes.
“The [U.S.-Pakistan] relationship is on thin ice, and [the arrest of Ghulam Nabi Fai] will make the ice thinner.”
It is almost equally likely that this case, which has been marching along for years now, came now for reasons that have very little to do with that overall circumstance. But it will be interpreted that way in Pakistan. They have a tendency to connect those sorts of dots, and it’s already happening.
I don’t think it will do anything in the broader sense in Pakistan to shift its strategy or its policies, but in the narrowest possible way, it could be useful–if only because the United States continues to try to gain the release of the Pakistani doctor who helped with the Osama bin Laden mission. This demonstrates relatively publicly that it may be true that the Pakistanis worked with the United States in that instance; it’s also true that some Americans have worked with the Pakistanis over a period of decades. So both sides are at it, and neither side is innocent–and that should be recognized, and perhaps that will help the case for the release of that doctor in Pakistan.
More broadly speaking, how much have the recent events, in particular the U.S. suspension of $800 million in military aid to Pakistan, affected the relationship?
It’s more incremental than some news sources, some analysts, are making it out to be. The original intention by the U.S. government had been to respond to the Pakistani move to kick U.S. officials [out of Pakistan following the U.S. Special Forces raid on bin Laden] and that had been telegraphed to the Pakistani side already. The line had been, “Look, if you remove our officials, a certain amount of assistance is going to be removed along with them.” And the Pakistanis had gone ahead with it anyway.
So that was the original intention, but it has expanded beyond that because it became public. It has become more of a diplomatic spat. It’s played into Pakistani public opinion, [and] it’s been portrayed as the beginning of the end of the relationship. [But] it is more of a reflection of the overall downturn in the relationship than intention of that suspended assistance.
How successful was the KAC in influencing lawmakers in how they think about Kashmir?
“The Obama administration moved fairly quickly away from the notion that solving Kashmir could solve Pakistan, which could solve Afghanistan.”
I saw relatively limited influence. I would characterize the Kashmir American Council as one of a variety of groups that are clearly engaged in an effort to inform and influence policymakers, lawmakers, and other influential opinion-makers around town. They had a regular e-mail chain; they had a variety of conferences and events that they sponsored. But their motivations were very plain. It wasn’t clear that they were being funded by the ISI, but it was clear that they had a particular bias and point of view, and anyone working on these organizations would see that as relatively transparent.
I see them as one voice in a crowded debate and would filter it accordingly. They may have been influential in raising issues, but they certainly weren’t successful in shifting U.S. policy. They may have been able to raise some manner of public awareness of Kashmir, but even that was relatively limited if you take it outside of the relatively small group of U.S. officials who even focus on Kashmir in the first place.
Since the U.S. war in Afghanistan, policymakers and analysts in Washington have argued periodically that Kashmir needs to be solved for a peaceful solution to the Afghan conflict. Some have even suggested that India should make concessions on Kashmir for regional stability. Is this arrest going to bring greater scrutiny to the soundness of the logic behind such policy recommendations?
It could. There was already a fair amount of scrutiny about the soundness of those policy recommendations. The Obama administration early on came in arguing not exactly that, but something similar–that the India-Pakistan conflict was motivating a lot of the violence inside of Afghanistan and a lot of the behavior of the Pakistani government, and in order to resolve the India-Pakistan dispute, Kashmir should be on the table.
But then that line of reasoning ran into the practical and diplomatic buzz saw of the Indian government and the recognition on the part of the Obama administration that pressuring the Indians on Kashmir or on their relationship with Pakistan was likely to be counterproductive. And in [Indian] Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, the United States actually had a very strong partner, who for his own reasons and for reasons of national security and state strategy was inclined to engage with the Pakistani government on his own terms and to seek progress in that relationship. So the Obama administration moved fairly quickly away from the notion that solving Kashmir could solve Pakistan, which could solve Afghanistan.
More on… Pakistan, U.S. Strategy and Politics
U.S.-Pakistan Relations: The Year Past, The Year Ahead
Speakers: Steve Coll, President and CEO, New America Foundation, Robert Grenier, Chairman, ERG Partners, and Daniel Markey, Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan and South Asia, Council on Foreign Relations
Presider: Tom Gjelten, Correspondent, NPR
February 2, 2012
Council on Foreign Relations
In the middle, Bob Grenier, currently chairman of ERG Partners. But for our purposes tonight, he’ll be speaking on the basis of his 27 years of experience in the intelligence community. A veteran of the CIA, Bob most recently served as director of the CIA’s Counterterrorism Center. Prior to that, he was Iraq mission manager, and prior to that, the agency’s station chief in Islamabad from 1999 to 2002, in other words, spanning the 9/11 attacks in that post.
And on my immediate right, Dan Markey, senior fellow for India, Pakistan and South Asia here at the council. And here he specializes in security and governance issues in South Asia. He’s currently writing a book — good luck with that, Dan — on the future of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. Prior to that, he was — he handled the South Asia portfolio in the policy planning staff at the State Department. And of course, he was project director of the council- sponsored Independent Task Force on U.S. strategy in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and some of the recommendations of that task force of course will be the subject of our discussion tonight.
So tonight we are focusing on one of the most complex and problematic situations in the world today: the multifaceted and multilateral relationship between Pakistan, the United States, Afghanistan and the Taliban. I would say that this is a critical moment in U.S.-Pakistan relations, but we have said that so many times before that it’s become a cliche. So rather than make that rather lame observation, let me just roll off a few of the items that really set the stage for this discussion tonight.
Going back just to last May and of course the raid that resulted in the killing of Osama bin Laden — and we’ve since learned that a Pakistani doctor who provided some of the key intelligence that made that raid possible has been arrested and is facing possible treason charges, just one indication of the rage that that raid engendered in Pakistan among those who feel that their sovereignty was violated; and of course the United States, in September, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Admiral Mullen, very publicly accusing Pakistan’s intelligence service of supporting the Haqqani terrorist network, which has been the main enemy of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, and then subsequent to that, just two months later, the U.S. air and helicopter strikes that resulted in the death of 24 Pakistani troops along the border when they were caught in the middle of that and, of course, the Pakistanis again, in their rage at that violation of their sovereignty, in their view, ordered an end to U.S. supply and resupply operations through Pakistan for operations in Afghanistan; and then, of course, finally and most recently, the controversy over the memo allegedly written by Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States, Husain Haqqani, in which he is said to have asked for U.S. support to guard against a possible military coup in Afghanistan (sic) on the part of the Pakistani army and of course that then provoked one of the most serious civil- military conflicts in Pakistan in many years.
So that’s not even to mention the broader context in which all these things are occurring — the prospect of a U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan in less than two years, and the preparations that are under way for that including the possible arrangement of negotiations with the Taliban in Qatar — so those are the — that’s sort of the parameters of the situation that we’re going to be talking about tonight.
Dan, I want to start with you just to give us like a 30-second summary of where you see U.S.-Pakistan relations right at this moment. Where do things stand in terms of, let’s say, the aid, the cutoff of aid, the refusal by Pakistan to accept aid, the supply line issue? Sort of, in a — in a nutshell, where do things stand right now?
DANIEL MARKEY: Well, in a nutshell, we are currently at a place which is certainly worse in the bilateral relationship than we’ve had since 9/11, there’s no doubt. So, yes, we’ve seen many crises over the past few years.
I was just thinking today is my fifth anniversary here at the council and, as soon as I showed up, things went haywire. No connection, of course –
MR. : (Inaudible) — your area.
MARKEY: Yeah, no connection. But we’ve seen crisis after crisis. But, over the past 18 months, it’s been a step-wise series of events, each one knocking us down from where we were to a point which is as low as we’ve seen since 9/11.
Now, in terms of our supply routes into Afghanistan and so on, I think some of these are sort of transitory issues. It sounds like at least some of that will be reopened in the — in the next few weeks. But there’s a broader question here and it’s a question that’s been certainly on Pakistani minds over the past two years and, in some ways, much longer than that, which is how we intend to resolve this end game in Afghanistan.
And I think, in many ways, that’s the context that they see us in the region. That’s how they perceive us. And the question in their mind is, how are we going to leave things? Are we going to leave Afghanistan the sort of mess that they — that we felt we left it at the end of the Soviet occupation? Are we going to make it even worse for them, in a sense, by doing things that might say privilege an Indian involvement in Afghanistan? And will the way that we leave it leave us with a really broken relationship between Washington and Islamabad?
I think that’s the framework. When you boil it down, they’re — each one of these incidents that we’ve seen over the past year in some ways relates to that and the deep uncertainty on the part of the Pakistanis about what our intentions are as we prepare for this departure that you mentioned in Afghanistan.
GJELTEN: Well, and that would be coming up in a couple of years and that’s where the United States is positioned right now.
You know, something that all three of you have observed is in reference to Pakistan’s support for the Taliban or for the Haqqani network — all three of you have been able to — have focused on sort of the rationality of that position.
And Bob, I wanted — I was struck by something that you write in sort of the classic analysis of an intelligence professional, talking about Pakistan’s support for the Taliban: “Given their perception of their national interests and the lack of effective alternative methods to pursue them, one can readily see why the Pakistanis behave as they do. I may disapprove as an American, but as a political realist, I cannot fault them.” Do you want to elaborate on that a little bit?
ROBERT GRENIER: That’s the problem with writing. Somebody’s likely to read it at some point. (Laughter.)
Yeah, you know, the — one of the real problems, I think, that we all have in dealing with Pakistan is it’s very difficult to get past one’s emotions.The Pakistanis are maddening as so-called allies. They — often, what they do, even when it’s in their interests, is, frankly, rather ignoble. Even when we understand it, we certainly can’t approve of it. And so I think it’s a tremendous burden, I think, for policymakers in dealing with those issues in the first place. And then, trying to sell them to a political public is almost impossible.
But, yeah, I think that for just the reasons that Dan has just mentioned, at this point, the U.S. has not decided for itself, I think, first of all — nor, clearly, in conjunction with the Afghan government — what our posture is going to look like in Afghanistan; how are we going to perceive our interests in the future and how are we going to try to realize them.
And under those circumstances, it becomes very, very difficult for the Pakistanis to imagine what that’s going to look like. And I’m sure that U.S. policymakers are telling them to some degree what that’s going to look like, but we have very, very little credibility. And it seems to me that unless and until we make very clear what will be the limits, if you will, of Pakistani aspirations in Afghanistan, we’re not going to be able to get to anything approaching an agreement with the Pakistanis as to what — how they will pursue their interests and how we can work out some sort of a rough — a rough joint approach in coming up with something which at the end of the day will serve our interests and theirs.
The way things are right now, they assume, as Dan has said, that we’re going to be leaving very shortly, and the only real ally that they have, potential ally, is the Taliban, and they’re certainly not going to cut ties with the Taliban under those circumstances.
GJELTEN: Do you think the Pakistanis actually know what their — what the limits of their activity in Afghanistan should be? And are they capable of confining themselves to those limits?
GRENIER: Well, I don’t think that the problem is with the Pakistanis being able to confine themselves. I think that the problem with the Pakistanis is getting them to do anything at all, even in pursuit of their own interests. People tend to think of — I mean, we see written all the time that the Taliban is in thrall to the Pakistanis, that the leadership of the Taliban is essentially under their control. I don’t think that that could be further from the truth. I think they have a very complicated relation with — relationship with them. I think they try to influence them in variousways. They certainly don’t control them. And I don’t think they’ve figured out for themselves, quite frankly, as to what are achievable national goals in Afghanistan.
GJELTEN: Steve, I read with great interest the New York Times story today summarizing this recent classified report on the state of the Taliban 2012 that’s based on 27,000 interrogations of 4,000 Taliban insurgents. And I think for me, and I think probably for a lot of people, one of the lines in that report that really jumped out was an observation that many Afghans are already bracing themselves for the prospect of a Taliban takeover in Afghanistan.
To what extent would you say that the Pakistanis are also assuming that? And again, does that explain their determination to sort of maintain influence with the Taliban, because they see themselves as dealing with the future power in Afghanistan?
STEVE COLL: Well, I think it’s important to recognize that their timelines are quite different than our own. I mean, they’re in the neighborhood forever. We have a plan that we’ve announced that has very specific calendar dates that relate to our political situation at home and in Europe, and our fiscal sustainability problems. And they’re not thinking about our timeline; they’re thinking about their own, for obvious reasons.
And my sense of the best guess — because nobody has a crystal ball about Afghanistan — that the Pakistani high command, core commanders, are operating from, is that they’re doubtful that the Pakistani army that — I mean the Afghan army that we’re — that we’re building will hold together beyond 2016 or 2018. They see trouble on the horizon after we go. And I think part of the way to understand their caution and passivity now is this thinking about a longer horizon.
Now, I think the second point I’d make about that is that I think the Pakistani Army is genuinely in a pretty weak position. They’ve got trouble on the horizon, and they don’t have a lot of cards to play. We’re not their partners in securing their interests in an Afghan transition, they believe — at least we haven’t established ourselves, in their minds, as reliable partners. They see India, Iran and other interests — other neighbors who don’t have, in their mind, Pakistan’s best interests at heart, already preparing for a post-NATO Afghanistan. And, you know, the Taliban, the Quetta shura leadership that — the old Islamic Emirate leadership that’s in Pakistan, and the Haqqanis, as distasteful and difficult and troublesome as they are as clients — and they are difficult clients, who would like, themselves, to be free of Pakistani influence and coercion — are about the only option that they — that they’ve got.
And so caution and a — and a longer timeline makes all the sense in that respect.
GJELTEN: Now, you just had a terrific article in the New Yorker on Mullah Omar. And one of the things that I thought was most admirable about it was the nuance in your analysis. I mean, you know, it’s so easy for us to just sort of assume that the Taliban are somehow operating as puppets of the ISI. You pointed out that — actually, that there’s a lot of strains in that relationship.
COLL: Yeah, well, certainly the Times report that you referred to and the document itself, excerpts of which have now been released, make clear how the Taliban themselves see their relationship with Pakistan. And they are — Taliban leaders and middle-level commanders are — they’re Afghans, first of all. They wish to operate independently. They resent the extent of dependency that they sometimes have on the Pakistani state for travel documents, for security, for the security of their family members. If you’re living in exile in Pakistan, and the Pakistani state knows you’re there, and you’re a person of significance in the Taliban command, you’re really not a free — you’re really not a free man. You may not be under ISI’s control, but you are certainly under their influence, and you’re dependent upon them in logistical ways.
And another point that Afghans have often made to me — and I — when I was in Kandahar this last time in December, I heard it again and again — you know, from the Taliban’s perspective, if you’re trying to even consider conversion from revolutionary violence into political negotiation, it is not in your interest — it’s not viable to enter those negotiations while being seen by other Afghans as an instrument of the Pakistani state because that weakens your own credibility with your countrymen. The Afghans who are in the Taliban leadership who are exploring negotiations, I think, would like to enter those negotiations from the most independent posture possible.
GJELTEN: Bob and Dan, Steve mentioned the sort of weakness of the — of the Pakistani army, which may strike some as kind of an odd observation given the role that the Pakistani army has played in Pakistani politics for so many years. But I’m curious what your view is of the position of the Pakistani army right now vis-a-vis other institutions in Pakistan and in the midst of this crisis.
Now, Bob, you wrote that they are, in some ways, the most competent institution in Pakistan. And yet you don’t seem to thinkthat they’re really in much of a position to exert that competence right now, it seems.
GRENIER: I think that if you view the situation from the perspective of the senior Pakistani officer corps, they’re in a very difficult situation. They are facing multiple insurgencies within their own country, which they’re having a very difficult time managing. They are very concerned lest the Afghan-focused militants in the area combine efforts with the Pakistan-focused militants against them. And that’s something that they absolutely have to avoid and is one of the root causes for some of what we would regard as their very unfortunate behavior vis-a-vis the Afghan Taliban.
They have lost a great deal of credibility, particularly — well, since the reign of General Musharraf, and now most particularly since the raid at Abbottabad. They don’t have the domestic political support to step in and take over the government if they felt the need to do so. And so they are having to make accommodations all the way around, whether it’s to the Americans, the Afghan Taliban, to their own militants and to a civilian government, which they don’t like and don’t trust.
GJELTEN: And Dan, what does this mean for the United States? You know, Musharraf was a very important ally of U.S. administrations. You know, does the U.S. have a dog in this fight? I mean, what is — what is the outcome sort of with — internally in Pakistan that would be most favorable to U.S. strategic interests?
MARKEY: Well, it’s a — it’s a really different and unusual time in Pakistani history insofar as, as Bob pointed out, the military doesn’t have the legitimacy, the credibility, the strength, the political punch that it had had in previous generations.
And I remember reading not long ago an interesting Pakistani column that pointed out that not long ago you would have expected, given the range of crisis that we’ve seen over the past year, that at any given time you would have seen a Pakistani, probably General Kayani, come onto the television sometime in the evening and announce that he had been forced, for national security reasons, to assert the army’s control over the state.
And yet you haven’t seen that.
And you’ve seen the rise — and Bob alluded to this — of other independent power centers in Pakistani politics. It’s partially the fact that the army was tarnished by the years of Musharraf’s rule. It’s partially that it was tarnished even by recent events by being too connected to the United States, by looking weak, by looking weak after the bin Laden raid and so on. It’s partially those things, but it’s also the rise of the — of a more independent media, of political opposition, politicians and so on, and by the judiciary, which also has asserted itself in ways that we’d never seen before in Pakistani history. So they do feel — the army does feel somewhat more constrained than it has in the past.
And yet, if you peel away some of these pieces, you see that they’re still pulling a lot of the strings from behind the scenes, particularly with respect to national security strategy and to regional strategy. There’s no one else who’s really running that policy other than the army. So while they feel very constrained and hemmed in in ways that they haven’t before, they don’t have that free hand, and it also makes it somewhat more complicated to figure out who’s really in charge, because it’s not transparent, yet there’s no one else — the president, the prime minister, the parliament as a whole, the public or some other — you know, you can’t find somewhere else where you would find that power center. So it does complicate things for us in a — in a diplomatic sense.
And it also — I think it leads to a certain amount of stalemate and gridlock in their own system, and it’s not surprising that they seem sometimes sort of befuddled and caught unaware by events as they happen and that we get somewhat contradictory or confusing outcomes.
GJELTEN: Now, another cliche in talking about Pakistan is that they view India as their existential enemy, and you have to sort of keep that in mind always in analyzing Pakistani behavior. Sort of bring up to date on that relationship and that focus, because, you know, one of the developments in the last few months that hasn’t gotten a tremendous amount of attention is the sort of very tentative rapprochement — that might even be too strong a word — between India and Pakistan; some confidence-building measures, I think, is probably the best to categorize it. And what’s the significance of that? And has this changed at all the strategic outlook of the Pakistani military and security forces? MARKEY: And it’s interesting; you have seen this surprising mellowing of the relationship between, in a sense — between Islamabad and New Delhi — certainly unanticipated in New Delhi, as far as I can tell. I think Indians were somewhat caught by surprise by some of the overtures that the Pakistanis have made in recent months, including on the trade front. The Indians that I spoke with were sort of, where did this come from? What’s driving this?
And I don’t really have an answer, except for two observations. One would be that on the part — on the part of the Pakistani civilian politicians, there has been an openness and an eagerness to engage, particularly on the economic front, with India for quite some time. And if given the opportunity, they have been inclined to seize that opportunity. So they’ve moved forward or tried to move forward on most favored nation status agreements, to open up a variety of — trade in a variety of sectors that had been closed.
At the same time, it appears that the army may have been looking, as it felt hemmed in on all of these other fronts, to try to at least ease the pressure on the Indian front and therefore open the door a bit to the Indian politicians — sorry, to the — to the Pakistani politicians to make that overture to India.
But it has only gone so far. It’s not — this is — there’s nothing that is irreversible about this. There’s nothing that’s really been accomplished that is concrete. But it’s certainly positive and it’s certainly a welcome change.
GJELTEN: Steve, with all of this as background — you know, the situation between Afghanistan, the Taliban, Pakistan, the United States, India — what’s your sense of Pakistan’s view of the prospect of negotiations between the United States and Taliban — initially kind of a two-sided negotiation? It’s kind of strange that Pakistan doesn’t seem to be as much of a party to that process as you might think they should be. What’s your sense of what their view of it is and their interest in it?
COLL: Well, I think they have an interest in it. I think they do feel aggrieved about the extent to which they’ve been involved. Whether their grievances are justified or not is another matter; they feel aggrieved about quite a lot of things about the U.S. relationship.
The Afghan government and other parties to the negotiations, I think probably including sections of our government, are not persuaded that putting the Pakistanis in the lead in this negotiation is a really wise way to get it started.
So there’s been tension about the extent to which the United States has been briefing the Pakistanis. That yielded, I think, over the last six months or so to a much franker exchange between both the Pakistanis and the Americans about where this thing was going, what it was going to look like.
But I — my sense is that the Pakistanis have been reluctant to take risks on behalf of these negotiations, that it’s not clear to them why it’s in their interest to really put their cards on the table at this stage for the reasons that I described before in part, that their timelines are quite different. We’re in a rush because we would like this all to be wrapped up with a — with a bow in time for 2014, but that doesn’t make — that doesn’t align with Pakistani perceptions.
You know, I think there are easy metrics to test Pakistani decision-making about these negotiations. They’ve — as I pointed out in The New Yorker piece, they’ve remained silent on the desirability of the negotiations. They could issue a statement saying, we think these are a good idea; we think the Taliban ought to participate. They could release some important Taliban figures who are in custody in Pakistan, (the “Liberator” ?) being the most notable of those, and perhaps they will over time.
I think that this is not a static stalemate between the United States and Pakistan. I think the next — I think we’ve possibly touched bottom in the last cycle. I don’t want to be too bold to predict that because every time I see my friends, who I’ve been in touch with in — about Pakistan since the late ’80s, they always — this one friend of mine has the repeated line, the good news is next year it’ll be worse. (Laughter.) And he’s been right for about 20 years.
And — but there’s — there — there’s a sense that, on both sides, there is activity under way, one step at a time, to at least clear the brush. Husain Haqqani is out of Pakistan; that matter is resolved. The crisis between the army and Gilani has been smoothed over. The negotiations over transit are under sail and will probably be resolved. And outreach is going on.
So I think, over the next six or eight months, there will be an effort on both sides to try to define a limited agenda of shared interests in which the stability of Afghanistan would loom as an obvious subject because it is in Pakistan’s interest to preventAfghanistan from cracking up. There is no doubt that if Afghanistan cracks up, Pakistan will suffer even more than it already has from the violence and conflict in the region and the United States would also wish to construct a transition in which Pakistan remains stable and intact as a state and so that is a pretty powerful common agenda. It would be irrational if the two sides could not find a way back to it. Whether negotiations with the Taliban are best understood as the central element of that shared agenda or not, I’m not –
MR. GJELTEN (?): Yeah.
COLL: — I’m not so sure.
MR. GJELTEN (?): There’s one other issue I want your thoughts on, and then we’re going to turn it over to the audience so you can ask your own questions.
But, over the last 10 years, the one enduring principle guiding U.S. policy with respect to Afghanistan has been the determination to deny, dismantle and defeat al-Qaida. Of course in the eve of — and you were there, Bob — in the eve of the — going to war in Afghanistan, the Taliban leadership in power at that time did have the opportunity to avoid war by simply getting the al-Qaida out of Afghanistan. And now when we talk about these negotiations, there’s a lot of confusion about what the red lines of the United States are. But one pretty clear red line is that the Taliban would have to sever their relations with al-Qaida. I’m curious, among all three of you, where do you see al-Qaida right now in this mix?
Bob, do you want to start?
GRENIER: Well, I think, in a way, al-Qaida is a little bit peripheral in the context of the dynamics on the ground and among ourselves, the Pakistanis and the Afghans. And yes, absolutely, it would be a red line for us that the Taliban would have to, in some way, you know, formally, you know, cut ties with al-Qaida. The problem is that I’m just not sure what that would mean.
I mean, at the end of the day, from the Taliban’s perspective, these are good Muslims who are behaving in the right way, who are coming to us and asking for our aid and succor. And they tend to see things — I mean, we hear that this is not your father’s Taliban and that they’ve evolved in terms of their thinking, but it’s hard for me to imagine them being put in that situation where they wouldn’t see the question in a very binary way.
And the correct answer, by their likes, is, well, of course; you are welcome.
Now, they might try to put limits on them. We’ve seen what that looks like before. Given the weakness of al-Qaida, what I’ve just said may not matter all that much, particularly if there is a continuing unilateral U.S. role in Afghanistan so we can control that situation with al-Qaida should it get out of hand in certain localities. But at the end of the day, I just don’t see what those sorts of promises from the Taliban would really mean in a practical way.
GJELTEN: Well, Dan, if in fact al-Qaida is peripheral to this — to this situation, I mean, what does that imply for the United States? Because every time you ask a U.S. official, what’s the justification for our involvement there, al-Qaida comes up.
MARKEY: Well, I think how a U.S. official justifies our involvement in the region on the basis of al-Qaida has something to do with American politics and so on.
And — but the — let me — let me take a slightly different stab at the al-Qaida. I wouldn’t say that al-Qaida is peripheral, although it is significantly diminished. What I would also observe is something that’s — getting back to the report from a year ago, pieces of it are, I think, somewhat dated. So much has happened over the year. But one of the pieces that, looking back, I thought was useful and important –
GJELTEN: You’re talking about the task force report?
MARKEY: — the task force report, yeah — is the — its focus on LeT, Lashkar-e-Taiba. Not all assessments of the regional threat from Pakistan and Afghanistan, certainly focusing more on Pakistan, really emphasize this as an issue. And the U.S. government has certainly ramped up its concern and some of its rhetoric about LeT, particularly after the 2008 Mumbai attack. And yet if you look at the region and you look at al-Qaida as increasingly a diminished or spent force, the question is whether you’re likely to see follow-on groups, organizations that are still motivated to undertake similar types of attacks in the region and globally. If you had to put your finger on any of the groups that might be the one, today it’s LeT. And its continuing ties or apparent ties with the Pakistani state make it exceptionally dangerous and in some ways unique. And even over the past few weeks you’ve seen stories about its sort of — he would say he’s no longer the leader of LeT, but Hafiz Saeed — you’ve seen some stories about increasing public appearances, demonstrations. This is an organization that is still strong, still active. And if we keep — if we take our eye off that ball, even if we have seriously decimated al-Qaida, I think we will be underestimating the nature of the threat — the terrorist threat from the region that will persist for a significant period of time.
GJELTEN: Steve, do you agree with that, that al-Qaida is really no longer the story that it was and that other actors are more important?
COLL: Well, I mean, let’s remind ourselves of the — of the background. By 2005-2006 al-Qaida in the tribal areas had become a revived international menace — the planes-bombing conspiracy of 2006, multiple attacks in Britain, the Zazi case, up — moving forward through 2007-2008 after the Red Mosque, when even more radicals flushed out and went up to the tribal regions, there was a gathering there of international capacity that al-Qaida had put together circa that period. Then the United States started pounding them and has pounded them pretty relentlessly for a period of two or three years, starting toward the tail end of the Bush administration, but picking up intensively in the Obama administration. And that has had a big impact on them. They’ve obviously — culminating in bin Laden’s killing last May.
Now, there is a — there is an interesting question, which is if al-Qaida is diminished to the point that it is no longer a global strategic threat, how would we ever recognize that; what would the implications be? And I think the critical question is are there individuals, groups, networks who still intend to carry out attacks outside the region, and that there will probably always be some who — about whom that can be said. They may be splinters from groups like Lashkar and Jaish-e-Muhammad and some of the sectarian groups. That’s the form of al-Qaida that probably has the most durability.
You know, in Afghanistan, al-Qaida really is peripheral. I mean, it maybe a hundred, 200 people, and that’s being generous to the Uzbeks and others who fly under the al-Qaida flag. And the interrogations of the — of the Taliban, though you know, obviously, it’s in the interest of detained Taliban to — they know what the Americans want to hear about al-Qaida, so they distance themselves.
But I had this interesting experience in December where I traveled independently in Kandahar, so I had to kind of dress local.
And all my Kandahari friends were very anxious that I look authentic so that I didn’t attract attention to the cars we were riding around in. And I remember I went shopping in Kabul to get all of my Kandahari fashions right. And –
MR. GJELTEN (?): Where’d you find a beard?
COLL: Well, so I — well, I did try. And — (laughter) — but I remember — I remember — I remember the night before I flew down, I looked in the mirror and I said, OK, I do not look like a Kandahari at all, but I do look like a Syrian al-Qaida facilitator. (Laughter.)
And in fact, on the ground, riding around, I presented as basically al-Qaida to — because I was — looked — blended dresswise, but fair — and all of my Kandahari friends and contacts and everyone I dealt with said, you watch; as soon as anyone picks you up, they’re going to turn and run in the other direction. Nobody wants anything to do with al-Qaida because it is nothing but trouble. And it was actually a very useful position for me to be in. (Laughter.)
(Chuckles.) Just turn and look the other way.
But yeah, so I — and I did not — I have not heard in years, outside of a few little places where — certainly not in the south — of any significant al-Qaida presence in Afghanistan.
GJELTEN: Yeah. Well, I’m curious what some of you might think about the implications of al-Qaida being such a diminished sort of part of the narrative in South Asia right now.
I’m been dragging these guys hither and yon all over the strategic landscape in South Asia. Maybe you folks can focus this discussion a little bit more. So this is your chance. Raise your hands. Identify yourself. Wait for the microphone. You know the drill.
Ambassador Schaffer.
QUESTIONER: Thank you. Tezi Schaffer, Brookings.
I’m troubled by all three presentations because I think all three of them dramatically underplay the conflict in strategic objectives between the United States and Pakistan. I don’t think the Pakistanisare ambivalent about U.S.-Taliban negotiations; I think they want to be in charge. I don’t think they’re unwilling to take risks for an outcome in Afghanistan that the U.S. would find acceptable. I think that’s not what’s important to them. What’s important to them is being the dominant power and freezing out India.
The key question facing the U.S., it seems to me, is, is Pakistan willing and able to reach some kind of strategic agreement with the United States? I am deeply skeptical that this is the case now, not just because of all the emotion churned up in the past year, but also because as time has gone on, these strategic conflicts have become deeper and edgier, so that a year or two ago, there would’ve been a strong case to make for the U.S. humoring Pakistan’s sensitivities in Afghanistan in the hopes of getting agreement on some outcome we could all live with; I think that case is much weaker now. And I think is the big problem the U.S. faces, plus the fact that Pakistan is a bigger prize than Afghanistan.
GJELTEN: Who wants to take a crack at that?
MR. GRENIER (?): Well, I agree with Tezi. (Chuckles.) In fact, I think that that’s absolutely right. I think that the Pakistanis are focused like a laser beam on their own interests. And under these ambiguous circumstances, they have no assurances that their interests will be taken into account by any process which is led by the United States. And I think that you’re right, that the influence of India in Afghanistan figures very, very heavily within the Pakistani calculation.
And so I think that if there is any hope for us to reach some sort of a strategic accommodation there, I think we have to realize a couple of things. One is that, as much as we would like to sort of have the equal involvement of all of the — of the neighbors of Afghanistan, in fact, there is one neighbor that counts much more than all the others, and that’s Pakistan. It’s just a reality and something that we have to accommodate, at least to some degree.
I think that it’s also true, therefore, that any achievable accommodation in Afghanistan that could have some support from the Pakistani side would require a great deal of difficult negotiation between ourselves — well, I guess, amongst ourselves, the Afghans — if you will, the Northern Alliance-dominated Afghans — and India. And it’s easy for me to sit here and say that it would be a grand exercise in enlightened self-interest if the Indians were to pull back to some degree in Afghanistan. It’s going to be very, very difficult to convince them of that, however.
But the other real trump in all of this is that, you know, it would be nice if, at the end of the day, we could reach some sort of an — of an accommodation with the Afghan parties and with the Pakistanis, which we might not particularly like, but we’d swallow hard and agree to if the Pakistanis could deliver. And I just don’t think that they can deliver. I mean, I sort of fantasize about havingsort of a Bashar al-Assad-type conversation with the Afghan Taliban where he sits down and says, look, you know, you’re my brothers.
And we are with you, and we want to do everything we possibly can for you, but this is the best we can do. And it’s up to you whether you accept it, but you should accept it.
There’s no one in Pakistan who can have that kind of conversation with them, and that, to me, is what scotches the whole thing. If the Pakistanis could actually deliver at the end of the day, we could use some kind of a deal. I just don’t see how they can deliver.
COLL: But you know, I would just add — I mean, Pakistan has a record of miscalculation in Afghanistan that is just appalling and persistent. It must reflect in a failure to understand Afghanistan adequately to manage Pakistan’s own interests there.
They’ve picked the wrong clients again and again. They — they’ll lecture Americans about how Afghanistan is, but in fact their understanding of Afghanistan’s internal dynamics, factions and decision-making is misguided. They misapprehend India’s intention and presence in the country to a great degree. And they make — they’ve made strategic judgments on the basis of bad analysis.
Now, I think there is some recognition in Pakistan — quiet, unadmitted — I don’t — I — which shouldn’t be a requirement that they come forward and confess these errors publicly; they’re written into history. I think there’s a recognition, at least in some quarters, that these mistakes are grave and part of a pattern of overreaching. And there’s — you know, there’s a sort of tentative search for, well, what would a Pakistani strategy in Afghanistan that wasn’t overreaching look like? And I haven’t heard an articulation of that from the Pakistani side that any Afghan I know in a position of authority would recognize as a plausible basis for a settlement.
So, at best, you could say we’re at the very beginning of a new imagination. But then you look at Pakistani conduct, and Pakistani conduct is the “same old, same old” –
GJELTEN: Now you –
COLL: — whether it’s out of weakness or aspiration.
GJELTEN: Well, you said before that they speak — that they think in the long term; yet in some ways it seems like they have a very short-term perspective and kind of, as you’ve all agreed, kind of lack strategic sort of depth in their thinking sometimes. COLL: Yeah, they have a language of strategy and certainly enduring interests and an acute sense of prerogative about Pakistan’s national security, you know, which is — which is the — justified in any sovereign country in principle.
But as to Afghanistan, they have proceeded from flawed assumptions about the pliability of Afghanistan to their strategy, about who — what clients are durable, about the nature of power- sharing in Kabul, about the enmity of the Northern Alliance. I mean, they’ve miscalculated on big questions again and again.
GJELTEN: Chris.
QUESTIONER: Thanks. Chris Isham from CBS. I think we’re kind of dancing around something here, and I wonder — maybe the land of fantasy — it’s unclear to me what kind of a deal might possibly exist. What kind of a deal could we negotiate with the Taliban, with Pakistan, as their supporters, that could even be conceivably realistic? I mean, India out, girls’ education, participation in the democratic process — I mean, you know, what kind of a deal, even in — even in the fantasy world do you — do the three of you think could you possibly put on the table that might have a chance of getting off the ground? And also considering that the unpopularity of the Taliban, which continues — we continue to see in the polling.
COLL: Well, I mean –
GJELTEN: Go ahead.
MR. : Sorry.
COLL: Well, I mean, it’s just worth pointing out there are former Taliban sitting in Parliament now. There are former HezB (ph) sitting in Parliament now. History is full of insurgent movements that converted to politics. So the idea generally would be to convert the Taliban into a political party or some section of the Taliban into a political party.
Obviously not every Taliban under arms — and perhaps not even half of Taliban under arms — would follow such an agreement, but to reduce violence, to sustain the state in Afghanistan, it’s certainly conceivable that a section of Taliban could be persuaded to enter politics. That’s the — I’m not offering odds; I’m just saying that’s the conceivable framework.
And then power-sharing in the center, but not control; it — devolved administration in which former Taliban are governors of provinces where they’ve historically been influential. Those are the sorts of things that people talk about. Even Afghans talk about that.
Afghans can imagine a stable — a semistable power-sharing arrangement. They’ve already negotiated such an arrangement with weakperipheral members of the Taliban. They know how to make those deals sustainable. But whether a strategic partnership of that type is conceivable, that’s another matter.
GJELTEN: Go ahead — go.
MR. : All right.
MARKEY: I would only make the observation that it doesn’t have to be a grand bargain that everybody’s included, and I think you’re alluding to this.
The process of a reconciliation dialogue can be primarily geared towards a narrower goal of peeling elements of the Taliban away, those who are willing in some way to be co-opted or encouraged to be a part of some sort of future Afghan politics. And the rest can be further driven to sort of the irreconcilable category, and then dealt with in other ways.
I think a broader observation, though: I’m also quite skeptical about the direction that our reconciliation agenda is taking, but for a different reason and a — and a reason that has, I guess, more to do with Pakistan than with Afghanistan — although I’m — I don’t know how a lot of Afghans would accept any kind of reconciliation.
But just on the Pakistan side, the message that we send to Pakistan, particularly when our reconciliation dialogue is increasingly open to all members of the Taliban, including the Haqqani network — or at least apparently that way — is that their strategy, their connections with these groups over the past decade that we have harped on again and again and again as being dangerous both to them and to us and to the region — their strategy, in their mind, looks like it’s working; that we’re coming around — and I’ve heard exactly this — that we’re coming around to their vision of the problem, which is that all of these groups can be incorporated and all of them should have a role to play in Afghanistan, no matter what blood is on their hands or what their — the nature of their previous relationship with al-Qaida may or may not have been.
As we come closer to that, I think we send — it’s a missed opportunity, in a sense, for what you might call a learning moment for Pakistan to see the danger of its connections with these types of organizations. And as I mentioned Lashkar-e-Taiba before, the only sort of logical conclusion that you might reach out of all of this is that connections with militants work; it is a valuable and effective tool for regional diplomacy. And if you’re a Pakistani, you might have good reasons to hold onto those tools into the future, even when they are exceedingly difficult to manage and exceedingly dangerous to Pakistan itself and certainly court the possibility of a future conflict between Pakistan and us, between Pakistan and India, and so on.
So I’m worried about reconciliation more for that reason. And I believe that our management of the process and who’s in and who’s out is meaningful and interpreted in important ways by Pakistanis for that reason.
GJELTEN: Yes, to you, ma’am — you, yeah.
QUESTIONER: Avis Bohlen, retired diplomat. I — I’m sort of puzzled by something I’m hearing several of you saying, which is that Pakistan doesn’t understand its own interests in this — in this situation; which implies that somehow we have understood what their interests are and are — you know, are sort of looking at it from up above and can understand what their greater — what their greater interest is. That doesn’t really make a lot of sense to me. I mean, I think we’ve — for every miscalculation that Pakistan may have made in Afghanistan, we’ve made about 10. Why is it impossible that they should — as you’ve said, there’s a longer timeline, and they’re looking at a longer situation and how it will evolve over time. Why is that not a perfectly valid definition of their own interest, which may not be very much in line with our own?
And just a second short question. Is India’s interest in Afghanistan strategic or opportunistic, economic? What’s its game?
GRENIER: Well, maybe I could just address the first part of that.
GJELTEN: Yeah.
GRENIER: And I guess — I guess what I would say is that even if the combined genius of the people on this stage is able to perceive Pakistani interests in Afghanistan better than they can — even if we accept that — it doesn’t matter, because at the end of the day, Pakistanis are going to follow their interests as they perceive them. We’re going to have to play that ball where it lies. And, yes, it can be moved, perhaps. They are not — they are not completely immune to some types of suasion — not pressure, but suasion. But at the end of the day, Pakistani views of their interests in Afghanistan are what they are, and we’re going to have to deal with them as they are.
GJELTEN: One of the points that you’ve made, Bob, is that this whole idea of carrots-and-stick and the transactional sort of approach just doesn’t work with Pakistan.
GRENIER: Well, I think that that raises another question. And that is that at the start of the — of this administration, I was one of the ones in one of the many studies who said, look, we have to get away from this transactional dynamic here; we really need to develop some more of a strategic approach to our relations with Pakistan. You know, we’ll — for the long term, we’ll — I think we’ve reached a point now where any kind of a transactional relationship would actually look pretty good. (Laughter.)
So I think that the best we can hope for, at least in the short term, is, yes, a transactional relationship, but a transactional relationship that’s focused on deals that are actually makeable. GJELTEN: Steve?
COLL: Well, let me just clarify the point that I was making earlier.
I think Pakistan has a record of failing to achieve its own objectives in Afghanistan. After the withdrawal of the Soviet Union, it pursued a (coup-making ?) strategy to seize control of Kabul through Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s forces and failed to do that. Afterwards it sought to control Afghanistan as a — as a source of strategic depth, as Pakistani generals put it, through the Taliban. The — even after they installed the Taliban in power in Afghanistan, that proved not to be a durable strategy because the Taliban were not in fact able to carry Pakistan’s interests in the way that the army had conceived. That’s the reason that I think they have miscalculated again and again.
I certainly agree that whatever they — you know, that the sovereign state of Pakistan will decide its own interests for itself. And countries, like people, have a funny way of not bending to other people’s perceptions of what their interests are.
The — I think, however, that history of failure is important because it was created by a narrow set of institutions in Pakistani national life, the army and the intelligence services, and that the policies that would be constructed by a Pakistan that enjoyed more normal civil-military relations and, indeed, more normal civilian control over foreign policy, would be far more likely to succeed. And coincidentally, they would also align better with the interests of the United States over the long run.
But the record of failure speaks for itself, and it is not a record that was created by a unified or civilian-led Pakistani government.
GJELTEN: Dan, you had a quick point.
MARKEY: Yeah, just a quick observation on India. Yes, it does, I think, have a strategic interest in Afghanistan. That relates to an interest that’s similar to ours, which is that they’ve suffered from terrorist acts that have originated in Afghanistan. They have an interest in making sure that they don’t see a return to a Taliban or Taliban-like regime that would play host to those kinds of groups. So that’s their first interest.
Beyond that, some Indians have greater ambition for more access to Central Asian — Asia, to energy markets and so on that would only really be possible if there was a relatively stable Afghanistan through which they could traverse. But it would also require them tobe able to get through Pakistan for the most part, unless they went through Iran.
GJELTEN: You had a question?
QUESTIONER: Hi, Pamela Constable from the Washington Post. Just a quick point of order: Did I understand or mishear — is this in fact on the record?
GJELTEN: Yes, it is on the record.
QUESTIONER: OK, great. Thanks.
I sort of wanted to change the conversation a little bit. We’ve been talking a lot sort of state to state and organization to organization and talking about al-Qaida and other groups as sort of almost formal entities. I’ve tried to explore both countries sort of more from the inside, sort of more in terms of public opinion and public sentiment. Very glad Dan talked about LeT, because I think — and in fact, I’d like to ask Steve about this as well, because the New America has done some very, very good polling.
LeT is a popular organization. The Taliban are a popular organization. In both of these societies, we are looking at populations — Muslim populations who are both more conservative, more emotionally defensive and supportive about sort of a muscular version, if not necessarily a violent version, of Islam than we, I think, were expecting or necessarily prepared to deal with. I think we’ve been focusing a lot militarily and a lot, again, state to state, making assumptions about who’s in power. These are both very weak states, including the Pakistan army, facing increasingly opinionated, vocal and violent populations who are — have very, very strong feelings about Islam and are increasingly anti-Western. So I was hoping that the speakers could comment on sort of what they see about happening in both of these societies as well as the state actors and the organizations that we’ve been talking about. Thank you.
GJELTEN: Steve, why don’t you take a crack at that, because you’ve got recent on-the-ground experience there, and I want to get to some other questions.
COLL: Well, just to speak of Pakistan, Pakistan is a very young society. It’s also a very plugged-in society, and it has a lot of the demographic and connectivity characteristics that preceded the Arab Spring. I think the rise of confidence in civil society and the media and the judiciary reflects a sense that Pakistan is changing from the bottom up. And I think the army recognizes that, and that’s why they would, I think, be unwise and recognize they would be unwise to intervene in politics the way they have in the past, as Dan was pointing out earlier.
They’re — the polling — one — somebody mentioned before about the role the United States now plays in the life of Pakistan. We did a — some polling recently, where it was sort of startling to realize that many more Pakistanis regard the United States as an enemy than regard India as an enemy. Considering that at the time that we did that polling, India had recently concluded what you might call its fourth war with Pakistan in 1999, and we were providing substantial aid to the country, the sense of being under siege, I think, is very widely felt in the country.
GJELTEN: Well, we’re going to have to wrap this discussion up. I got time for one more quick question. I see Joe back there. And then you can grab us afterwards or something, but quick question from Joe Cirincione..
QUESTIONER: Thank you. Thank you very much for comments. Joe Cirincione, Ploughshares Fund. And thank you, Tom (sp), for your fluid chairing of this insightful panel.
Next week I’m going to a meeting where I’m expected to give recommendations for U.S. policy towards Pakistan, and I have no idea what to say. (Laughter.) So help me out. Give me the one thing, each of you, that the U.S. should be doing with Pakistan that it’s not doing now.
GJELTEN: One sentence each.
Dan, you’re a policy planning guy, so you can start.
MARKEY: Sure. I’ll go — I will — I will take the safe route — go back to a recommendation that was in our task force report, which has been made for about a decade now and still hasn’t been acted upon, and it has to do with our trading relationship with Pakistan. There’s a — there’s an opportunity there in the textile sector to open up.
Now, this is politically dead on Capitol Hill right now because nobody is particularly eager to do more for Pakistan. But once we hopefully get back to a position where we recognize that Pakistan’s — excuse me — longer-term stability is of a meaningful significance to us, and we start to ask how we might do that without spending billions — tens of billions of dollars in aid, trade starts to look more palatable.
GJELTEN: Bob?
GRENIER: I guess my first piece of advice would be figure out what the U.S. posture in Afghanistan post-2014 is going to look like, and then get there as quickly as you can and as credibly as you can, because unless we can communicate that in a credible way, we won’t have the basis on which to reach a whole series of other agreements with the — with the Pakistanis. And a whole series of decisions on the part of other players will be predicated — (from ?) the part of the Pakistanis, the part of the Afghan Taliban and others — on what the continuing U.S. posture in Afghanistan for the long term is — (inaudible) — going to look like.
COLL: Yeah, I think the record of failure of U.S. policy in Pakistan is informed, you know, by this pattern of constantly privileging short-term security crises over long-term civilian control over the country and the development of normal civil-military relations in Pakistan, as well as a pattern of coming and going in emotional states every 10 years.
And so I would wish to reset, since resetting is now necessary, around a long — a clear, durable, long-term commitment to civilian- led democracy in Pakistan as articulated by Pakistanis themselves. That is what Pakistan wishes for itself. It has a constitutional system that has often produced very flawed civilian leaders. That policy does not require the diminishment of the army’s role in protecting Pakistan’s borders and national security, but it does mean returning to the first principles of American relations with big, large quasi-democracies like Pakistan, which to have the courage of our own convictions. Even at every moment that we’re tested, we are often — we often mute ourselves in the context of Pakistan in ways we would never would in Indonesia or Tunisia or even Colombia or Mexico. And so I think that we’ve got to stop deterring ourselves from the pursuit of this — of the Pakistan that so many Pakistanis themselves envision.
GJELTEN: Well, Joe, I get — you’ve got some talking points now. And I hope that — (laughter) — I hope that’s helpful.
Well, I’d like to thank Steve Coll and Bob Grenier and Dan Markey for coming. I’d like to thank you all.
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THIS IS A RUSH TRANSCRIPT.
More on… Pakistan, U.S. Strategy and Politics
Dangers in U.S.-Pakistan Rift
Author: Jayshree Bajoria
February 17, 2011
The Davis case has fanned anti-Americanism (PressTV) among many Pakistanis who distrust the United States for what they see as meddling in their affairs, a charge largely fueled by the CIA-operated drone attacks in the country. “What is euphemistically called a trust deficit (PDF) has for some time defined the U.S. relationship with the elites and public of Pakistan, and will continue to influence the partnership,” writes Stephen Cohen of the Brookings Institution.
U.S. goals for a stable and democratic Pakistan are also frustrated by recurring tensions between India and Pakistan that threaten a regional conflict, and by the Pakistani army’s continuing support for some militant groups as strategic assets in its foreign policy, as this Crisis Guide notes. A persistent thorn in Washington’s side is the army’s refusal to send troops into the militant stronghold of North Waziristan.
This week, the Obama administration proposed to Congress $3.1 billion in financial assistance (PTI) to Pakistan for 2012. This includes $1.5 billion for the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, which is largely aimed at strengthening Pakistan’s economy, infrastructure, and democratic institutions. But as an official U.S. government assessment notes (WSJ), the civilian aid program has “not been able to demonstrate measurable progress.” In this essay, Nancy Birdsall and Wren Elhai of the Washington-based Center for Global Development suggest some measurable targets that could help the United States and Pakistan meet shared goals for effective and transparent development.
The foremost challenge for the United States in dealing with Pakistan has been balancing long-term goals with response to immediate threats such as al-Qaeda. “My sense is that we are playing to the short term at this point,” says CFR Senior Fellow Daniel Markey in a video interview. One policy recommendation to address this challenge, says Markey, is to open up trade between the United States and Pakistan. “It’s that kind of bigger, more long-term thinking that’s going to be a tough lift,” he says, but it will help both in near term and over the long term.
Analysis:
In the Washington Quarterly, Paul Staniland of the University of Chicago assesses U.S. strategy for Pakistan.
This CFR Task Force Report supports U.S. investment in a long-term partnership with Pakistan, but emphasizes it is only sustainable if Pakistan acts against terrorist organizations based on its soil.
Background:
A survey of nearly four hundred Pakistani journalists (NYT) by Lawrence Pintak of Washington State University and Syed Javed Nazir, a newspaper editor, looks at how these journalists view the U.S. policy in Pakistan and its ongoing operations in Afghanistan.
More on… Pakistan, Diplomacy, U.S. Strategy and Politics
Support Process Over Personalities in Pakistan
Policy Innovation Memorandum No. 28
Author: Daniel Markey, Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia
Publisher Council on Foreign Relations Press
Release Date February 2013
Pakistan’s leadership transitions over the course of 2013 will complicate, perhaps even disrupt, the already tenuous U.S.-Pakistan relationship. As in the past, Washington may be tempted to lend support to Pakistani leaders with “pro-American” leanings. U.S. officials should resist these temptations. The United States should cast its weight behind Pakistan’s constitutional, rule-based process of leadership transition.
By actively encouraging Pakistan’s leaders to stick to their own rules (while otherwise standing above the political fray), the United States would improve prospects for an orderly transfer of power that would contribute to Pakistan’s overall stability. Pakistani leaders who emerge from such a process may not be especially friendly to Washington, but they will at least be open to businesslike cooperation on matters of greatest U.S. concern.
Tumultuous Politics Create Near-Term Challenges
Pakistan’s most powerful institutions face leadership changes in 2013. National assembly elections are expected in late spring 2013, and the opposition is favored to win. Victorious parties should form a government by summer, but the politicking will not end there. An indirect presidential election follows in September, the army chief’s term ends in November, and in December the Supreme Court chief justice will reach mandatory retirement age.
All of these changes will distract Pakistan’s leadership from external affairs and limit prospects for near-term bilateral cooperation. U.S. officials should give careful thought to how their actions might influence Pakistan’s political environment. Counterterror operations could be particularly disruptive during the election season. U.S. drone strikes and other covert activities on Pakistani soil are broadly unpopular; if conducted in the midst of campaigning they would help mobilize support for candidates with particularly anti-American platforms and tip the balance in the next national assembly. U.S. targeting decisions throughout 2013 should give greater weight to the political costs of drone strikes as compared to their tactical benefits. Once Pakistan’s sitting assembly is replaced by a caretaker government (for the two months before election day), the United States should suspend drone strikes, making exceptions only for Ayman al-Zawahiri and plotters of imminent terrorist attacks.
The Path to Political Stability
Given its size, location, and nuclear arsenal, the United States has a strong interest in Pakistan’s political stability. A civilian democratic order should improve Pakistan’s prospects for stability over the long run, but for now it remains a messy work in progress. Orderly transfers of power and on-time retirements cannot be taken for granted in a country with a long history of election rigging and military interference. Since 2007, Pakistan’s activist chief justice, Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry, has been an unpredictable factor. With violence in many parts of the country, political turmoil could fuel wider conflict. If Pakistan’s political actors stick to the rules in 2013—win or lose—it would be a triumph for national stability.
Admittedly, sticking to the rules could elevate less friendly faces to power in Islamabad. A new batch of leaders could impede U.S. cooperation or fight among themselves. Opposition leader and former prime minister Nawaz Sharif has a conflictual history with the army. If his Pakistan Muslim League–Nawaz (PML-N) party wins, it would set up another civil-military contest for power. Imran Khan, head of the opposition Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) party, has criticized U.S. counterterror policy, particularly drone strikes. A new chief justice is more likely to be co-opted or silenced, ending a remarkable period of judicial activism. The next army chief could—just like his two predecessors—begin his tenure by retreating from constructive diplomacy with India. He might also be less cooperative with the United States as it attempts to withdraw from Afghanistan and to accelerate the process of political dialogue with Afghan insurgents.
All of these scenarios would be setbacks for the United States, but they are manageable. The most dangerous, revolutionary scenarios will become plausible only if the process of political transition breaks down. Pakistanis might then rise in mass protest, or the army might split into factions. Recognizing these dangers, Pakistan’s military and civilian leaders have all committed to following constitutional processes. The true test, however, will come when they face the imminent prospect of losing their jobs. The president, army chief, and chief justice have shown a will to power that could lead them to obstruct a peaceful transfer of power.
Bent or broken rules will threaten stability and weaken Pakistan’s leaders. If the sitting government or president wins reelection through a rigged process, they would sacrifice the popular legitimacy conferred by a fair vote. That would diminish their ability to govern, deliver much-needed reforms, and expand cooperation with Washington. The United States should resist the temptation to interfere in support of friendly Pakistani faces even if they desperately seek U.S. help. Such interference could contribute to a breakdown in the political process.
Pakistan’s other leaders would also weaken their institutions by extending their terms in office. Unlike in 2010, when Washington tacitly endorsed army chief Ashfaq Parvez Kayani’s extension for three years past the norm, U.S. officials should express a preference for the standard practice of appointing a successor. A new extension would be deeply unpopular in the army’s ranks and risk a split among the officers of the nation’s most powerful institution. Similarly, Washington should speak in favor of seeing Pakistan’s Supreme Court chief justice retire on time. To see the nation’s top judge flout the law would damage the judiciary’s newfound legitimacy and independence.
How to Support Pakistan’s Process
Because the United States has a history of interfering in Pakistani politics—including the Bush administration’s attempt to broker a deal between President Pervez Musharraf and Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) leader Benazir Bhutto in 2007—Pakistanis will be on the lookout for any evidence that the United States is trying to tip the political scales in favor of pro-American politicians or generals. For instance, many Pakistanis view U.S. aid programs that fund the ruling government’s pet projects, like the Benazir Income Support Program, as politically biased. Even if these are worthy programs, the United States should avoid expanding its support for them in the period before elections.
Nor will it be enough for U.S. officials to stand silently by as the political process plays out. U.S. silence or inaction in the face of Pakistani poll rigging or other political games would be perceived as meddling in favor of the rule breakers. To proceed in a situation in which even silence could count as interference, and standard talking points about America’s democratic values sound more patronizing than credible, U.S. diplomats should meticulously frame policies in terms of support for Pakistan’s constitution. They should pledge, in public and closed-door meetings with civilian and military leaders in power and in the opposition, to work with all who adhere to Pakistan’s legal, constitutional order. That focus offers the only appropriate, politically correct device for encouraging everyone to follow the rules.
To back up this rhetoric, Washington should extend diplomatic, financial, and technical support through existing State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development projects to groups working to preserve the constitutional process, such as Pakistan’s nonpartisan election commission and various election-monitoring teams. U.S. diplomats should rebuff charges of favoritism by establishing close, if discreet, back-channel ties with emissaries from opposition parties—PTI, PML-N, and others—and the chief justice. The United States should coordinate with China (as it did during the tumultuous period at the end of Musharraf’s regime) to deliver a unified message to Pakistani generals about the value of adhering to the constitutional order, if chiefly as a means of safeguarding army unity. China has a major stake in Pakistan’s stability, uniquely strong military-military ties, and quiet influence in Pakistani political circles.
In its efforts to buttress U.S. rhetoric and raise the costs to Pakistanis of breaking their own rules, the Obama administration should avoid loud threats of sanctions and complete aid cutoffs; they are not credible given other U.S. goals in Pakistan and would only contribute to instability. Over the past year, however, Washington has managed to calibrate the flow of hundreds of millions of dollars in military and civilian aid to Pakistan. This ability to quietly dial aid up and down, while always holding out the incentive of future assistance and partnership, offers Washington a more flexible tool that should be used as leverage with Pakistan’s leaders if, for instance, the military considers delaying elections or the civilian government appears poised to rig the polls.
Back the Whole Course, Not One Horse
By supporting a rules-based process of transition in Pakistan rather than backing specific personalities, the United States would help to stabilize Pakistan. Washington cannot dictate Pakistan’s political outcomes, but it can create clear external disincentives for Pakistani leaders to avoid rule breaking in ways that could lead to the breakdown of social and political order. By itself, outside U.S. pressure would not be sufficient. Combined with increasingly widespread domestic support for constitutional rule, however, it can tip the balance in favor of stability.
Prioritizing processes over personalities would also strengthen the U.S.-Pakistan relationship by dampening common Pakistani charges of U.S. hypocrisy and political manipulation. If Washington should have learned anything from past experience in Pakistan, it is that to support specific Pakistani leaders is, by definition, to back the wrong horse. For if Washington’s favorites win, they are tainted by the association; if they lose, the winners will hold a grudge. By not alienating Pakistan’s legitimate contenders for power, Washington would improve its ability to work with whomever holds the reins in Islamabad once the transitional dust clears. Pakistan’s new leaders might not be friendlier, but the bilateral relationship is likely to be more normal in ways that would enable businesslike dealings on the full range of U.S. security concerns, from counterterrorism and nonproliferation to regional stability.
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Daniel Markey is senior fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia at the Council on Foreign Relations.
Guest Post: Pakistan’s Elections and Drone Strikes
by Guest Blogger for Micah Zenko
February 28, 2013
Supporters of different opposition political parties during a rally in Islamabad on February 4, 2013 (Mian Khursheed/Courtesy Reuters).On Tuesday, my colleague Dan Markey published a new CFR Policy Innovation Memorandum (PIM), “Support Process Over Personalities in Pakistan.” In it, he argues that the United States should avoid playing favorites as Pakistani leadership transitions unfold over the course of 2013. As part of his broader argument, he suggests that the U.S. government should refrain from drone strikes during the campaign season prior to parliamentary elections. I’ve asked him to write a guest post about this aspect of the PIM.
In my PIM, the argument against U.S. drone strikes is a relatively narrow and pragmatic one. Whatever you think about the effectiveness of drone strikes in Pakistan, it is clear that they offer propaganda opportunities to parties most opposed to cooperation with the United States. In the supercharged environment of national elections, drone strikes could tip the balance in Pakistan’s new national assembly, making it even harder for Washington to deal with whatever government takes shape. With this in mind, I argue that U.S. policymakers should be even more cautious in their use of drones than usual, and that Washington should suspend strikes except against imminent terrorist attacks or al-Qaeda’s number two, Ayman al-Zawahiri.
The United States should execute this shift in drone policy silently. Even if—as Micah argues in his Council Special Report Reforming U.S. Drone Strike Policies—Washington would be smart to review its overall approach to the use of drones, U.S. officials will certainly want to avoid steps that could severely limit their flexibility in Pakistan. Washington would not, for instance, want its moratorium on drone strikes during the campaign season to lead Pakistanis to believe that they can turn off the strikes forever.
As a practical matter, however, it looks like some sort of renegotiation of the terms of U.S.-Pakistan counterterror cooperation, including drones, looms in the near future. If Pakistani opposition parties take power in the national assembly, if President Zardari fails to secure his job in September, and if the army chief retires in November, the United States will face a new cast of characters in all of Pakistan’s top national security jobs. Exactly how the U.S. drone campaign will survive these dramatic changes remains unclear.
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Posted by Iron Hand 1 February 28, 2013 at 4:49 pm The only thing that all Pakistani’s want is our money. Why are we so weak that we bend to them when they demonstrate against our use of drones to kill al-Qaeda bad-guys. These people have given the US a hard time when we try to supply our troops in Afghanistan. Pakistan is full of supporters of Taliban killers who are the targets of our drone effort. Pakistan is a split country with no clear leadership against the Taliban. As a matter of fact, they support Taliban people against us all the time. We should tell them to start cooperating with us or the money we give them is gone!
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Posted by I know how they think March 1, 2013 at 3:40 am Pakistan is an open vessel for anyone with money to exert influence. The US should make sure it has this country swamped with food aid. Never stop the drone strikes, because Pakistan has this destructive love affair with being influential in the region, via blatant terrorism. Look at terror acts in Mumbai and the role of the government in harbouring Osama bin Laden and thus in effect, masterminding 911. Why Saddam was toppled and not the ISI, only the American government and the Pakistani security establishment will know for sure.
Breaking Up Is Not Hard to Do
Coming to America: Bogra, October 1954. (Getty)Washington has not had an easy time managing the U.S.-Pakistani relationship, to put it mildly. For decades, the United States has sought to change Pakistan’s strategic focus from competing with India and seeking more influence in Afghanistan to protecting its own internal stability and economic development. But even though Pakistan has continued to depend on U.S. military and economic support, it has not changed its behavior much. Each country accuses the other of being a terrible ally — and perhaps both are right.
Pakistanis tend to think of the United States as a bully. In their view, Washington provides desperately needed aid intermittently, yanking it away whenever U.S. officials want to force policy changes. Pakistanis believe that Washington has never been grateful for the sacrifice of the thousands of Pakistani military and security officials who have died fighting terrorists in recent decades, nor mourned the tens of thousands of Pakistani civilians whom those terrorists have killed. Many in the country, including President Asif Ali Zardari and General Ashfaq Kayani, the army chief, recognize that Pakistan has at times gone off the American script, but they argue that the country would be a better ally if only the United States showed more sensitivity to Islamabad’s regional concerns.
On the other side, Americans see Pakistan as the ungrateful recipient of almost $40 billion in economic and military assistance since 1947, $23 billion of it for fighting terrorism over the last decade alone. In their view, Pakistan has taken American dollars with a smile, even as it covertly developed nuclear weapons in the 1980s, passed nuclear secrets to others in the 1990s, and supported Islamist militant groups more recently. No matter what Washington does, according to a growing cadre of U.S. senators, members of Congress, and editorial writers, it can’t count on Pakistan as a reliable ally. Meanwhile, large amounts of U.S. aid have simply failed to invigorate Pakistan’s economy.
The May 2011 U.S. covert operation in Abbottabad that killed Osama bin Laden brought the relationship to an unusually low point, making it harder than ever to maintain the illusion of friendship. At this point, instead of continuing to fight so constantly for so little benefit — money for Pakistan, limited intelligence cooperation for the United States, and a few tactical military gains for both sides — the two countries should acknowledge that their interests simply do not converge enough to make them strong partners. By coming to terms with this reality, Washington would be freer to explore new ways of pressuring Pakistan and achieving its own goals in the region. Islamabad, meanwhile, could finally pursue its regional ambitions, which would either succeed once and for all or, more likely, teach Pakistani officials the limitations of their country’s power.
FRIEND REQUEST
It is tempting to believe that tensions between the United States and Pakistan have never been worse. And to be sure, the public in each country currently dislikes the other: in a 2011 Gallup poll, Pakistan ranked among the least liked countries in the United States, along with Iran and North Korea; meanwhile, a 2012 Pew poll found that 80 percent of Pakistanis have an unfavorable view of the United States, with 74 percent seeing it as an enemy. Washington’s threats to cut off aid to Pakistan and calls in Islamabad to defend Pakistani sovereignty from U.S. drone incursions seem to represent a friendship that is spiraling downward.
But the relationship between the United States and Pakistan has never been good. In 2002, at arguably the height of U.S.-Pakistani cooperation against terrorism, a Pew poll found that 63 percent of Americans had unfavorable views of Pakistan, making it the fifth most disliked nation, behind Colombia, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, and North Korea. Before that, in 1980, soon after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, a Harris poll showed that a majority of Americans viewed Pakistan unfavorably, despite the fact that 53 percent supported U.S. military action to defend the country against communism. During the 1950s and 1960s, Pakistan did not feature in U.S. opinion polls, but its leaders often complained of unfavorable press in the United States.
Pakistani distaste for the United States is nothing new, either. A 2002 Pew poll found that about 70 percent of Pakistanis disapproved of the United States. And their negativity predates the war on terrorism. The September 1982 issue of The Journal of Conflict Resolution carried an article by the Pakistani civil servant Shafqat Naghmi based on analysis of keywords used in the Pakistani press between 1965 and 1979. He found evidence for widespread anti-Americanism going back to the beginning of the study. In 1979, a hostile crowd burned down the U.S. embassy in Islamabad, and attacks on U.S. official buildings in Pakistan were reported even in the 1950s and 1960s.
From Pakistan’s founding onward, the two countries have tried to paper over their divergent interests and the fact that their publics do not trust one another with personal friendships at the highest levels. In 1947, Pakistan’s leaders confronted an uncertain future. Most of the world was indifferent to the new country — that is, except for its giant next-door neighbor, which was uncompromisingly hostile. The partition of British India had given Pakistan a third of the former colony’s army but only a sixth of its sources of revenue. From birth, therefore, Pakistan was saddled with a huge army it could not pay for and plenty of monsters to destroy.
British officials and scholars, such as Sir Olaf Caroe, who was the pre-partition governor of the North-West Frontier Province (now Khyber Pakhtunkhwa), and Ian Stephens, the editor of The Statesman, encouraged Pakistan’s founding fathers to keep the country’s large army as a protection against India. Lacking financing for it, though, Pakistani leaders turned to the United States, reasoning that Washington would be willing to foot some of the bill given Pakistan’s strategically important location at the intersection of the Middle East and South Asia.
Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the country’s founder and first governor-general, and most of his lieutenants in the Muslim League, Pakistan’s main political party, had never traveled to the United States and knew little about the country. To fill the role of ambassador to the United States, they chose the one among them who had, Mirza Abol Hassan Ispahani, who had toured the United States in the mid-1940s to drum up support for an independent Muslim state in South Asia. In a November 1946 letter to Jinnah, Ispahani explained what he knew of the American psyche. “I have learnt that sweet words and first impressions count a lot with Americans,” he wrote. “They are inclined to quickly like or dislike an individual or organization.” The Cambridge-educated lawyer tried his best to make a good impression and became known among the Washington elite for his erudition and sartorial style.
Back in Pakistan, Jinnah attempted to befriend Paul Alling, the newly appointed U.S. ambassador in Karachi, then Pakistan’s capital. In one of their meetings, Jinnah complained about the sweltering heat and offered to sell his official residence to the U.S. embassy. The ambassador sent him a gift of four ceiling fans. Jinnah was also at pains to give interviews to U.S. journalists, the best known of whom was Life magazine’s Margaret Bourke-White. “America needs Pakistan more than Pakistan needs America,” Jinnah told her. “Pakistan is the pivot of the world, the frontier on which the future position of the world revolves.” Like many Pakistani leaders after him, Jinnah hinted that he hoped the United States would pour money and arms into Pakistan. And Bourke-White, like many Americans after her, was skeptical. She sensed that behind the bluster was insecurity and a “bankruptcy of ideas . . . a nation drawing its spurious warmth from the embers of an antique religious fanaticism, fanned into a new blaze.”
The visceral anti-Americanism among many Pakistanis today makes it difficult to remember how persistently Jinnah and his ambassadors lobbied the United States for recognition and friendship in those earlier years. Yet the Americans were not convinced. As a State Department counselor, George Kennan, for example, saw no value in having Pakistan as an ally. In 1949, when he met Pakistan’s first prime minister, Liaquat Ali Khan, Kennan responded to Khan’s request to back Pakistan over India by saying, “Our friends must not expect us to do things which we cannot do. It is no less important that they should not expect us to be things which we cannot be.” Kennan’s message was reflected in the paltry amount of U.S. aid sent to the new country: of the $2 billion Jinnah had requested in September 1947, only $10 million came through. That dropped to just over half a million dollars in 1948, and to zero in 1949 and 1950.
BROTHERS IN ARMS
Pakistan finally got what it wanted with the election of Dwight Eisenhower in 1952. His secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, embraced the idea of exchanging aid for Pakistani support of U.S. strategic interests. He saw Pakistan as a vital link in his scheme to encircle the Soviet Union and China. The aggressively anticommunist Dulles also relished the thought of having a large army of professional soldiers with British-trained officers on the right side in the Cold War. Influenced by earlier descriptions of Pakistanis, Dulles believed them to be especially martial: “I’ve got to get some real fighting men in the south of Asia,” he told the journalist Walter Lippmann in 1954. “The only Asians who can really fight are the Pakistanis.”
Muhammad Ali Bogra, who had taken up the post of Pakistani ambassador to the United States in 1952, was also eager to cement the friendship. He was as successful as his predecessor at cultivating American elites, especially Dulles, who was already leery of India’s leaders due to their decision to stay nonaligned during the Cold War. Bogra ensured that his own anticommunist sentiments were well known to Dulles, as well as to the journalists and politicians with whom Bogra went bowling in Washington. Meanwhile, Eisenhower tasked Arthur Radford, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, with earning the respect of powerful Pakistanis — particularly the military commander General Muhammad Ayub Khan, who would rule the country by the end of the decade. Ayub Khan was instrumental in installing Bogra as Pakistan’s prime minister in 1953, after a palace coup, in the hope that Bogra’s friendship with the Americans would expedite the flow of arms and development assistance to Pakistan. Indeed, military and economic aid to Pakistan began to rise rapidly; it would hit $1.7 billion by the end of the decade.
In return, the United States got Pakistan to join two anti-Soviet security arrangements: the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization, in 1954, and the Baghdad Pact (later called the Central Treaty Organization), in 1955. But there were already signs of trouble. Any notion that Pakistan would join either alliance grouping in a war was quickly dispelled, as Pakistan (like many others) refused to contribute much money or any forces to the organizations. Dulles traveled to Pakistan in 1954 looking for military bases for use against the Soviet Union and China. On his return, he tried to conceal his disappointment in the lack of immediate progress. In a memo he wrote for Eisenhower after the trip, he described U.S.-Pakistani relations as an “investment” from which the United States was “not in general in a position to demand specific returns.” According to Dulles, the U.S. presence in Pakistan meant that the United States could expand its influence over time, leading to “trust and friendship.”
Ayub Khan, for his part, assumed that once Pakistan’s military had been equipped with modern weapons — ostensibly to fight the Communists — it could use them against India without causing a major breach with the United States. In his memoirs, he acknowledged that “the objectives that the Western powers wanted the Baghdad Pact to serve were quite different from the objectives we had in mind.” But he argued that Pakistan had “never made any secret of [its] intentions or [its] interests” and that the United States knew Pakistan would use its new arms against its eastern neighbor. Still, when Pakistan tested Ayub Khan’s theory in 1965, by infiltrating Kashmir and precipitating an all-out war with India, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson suspended the supply of military spare parts to both India and Pakistan. In retaliation, in 1970, Pakistan shut down a secret CIA base in Peshawar that had been leased to the United States in 1956 to launch U-2 reconnaissance flights. (Although Pakistan had made the decision to shut down the base right after the 1965 war, it preferred to simply not renew the lease rather than terminate it prematurely.)
U.S.-Pakistani relations were scaled back after the suspension of military aid, but neither side could give up on trying to find some common ground. Ayub Khan’s successor as president, General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan, agreed to serve as an intermediary between the United States and China, facilitating the secret trip to Beijing in 1971 by Henry Kissinger, then U.S. President Richard Nixon’s national security adviser. Later that year, Nixon showed his gratitude for Pakistan’s help by favoring West Pakistan against separatist East Pakistan and its Indian supporters during the civil war that resulted in the creation of Bangladesh. The United States played down West Pakistani atrocities in East Pakistan, and Nixon tried to bypass Congress to provide some materiel to West Pakistani forces. But that did not stop the country from dividing. As a civilian government led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto picked up the pieces in the new, smaller Pakistan, the United States and Pakistan maintained some distance. During a 1973 visit by Nixon to Pakistan, Bhutto offered Nixon a naval base on the coast of the Arabian Sea, which Nixon declined. By the time the relationship had started to warm again, when Washington lifted the arms embargo on Pakistan in the mid-1970s, Pakistan had already sought economic support from the Arab countries to its west, which were by then growing flush with petrodollars.
OFF BASE
The next time the United States and Pakistan tried to work together, it was to expand a relatively small Pakistani-backed insurgency in Afghanistan at the United States’ request. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, in 1979, the United States saw an opportunity to even the score following its poor showing in the Vietnam War and bleed the Soviet army dry. The Afghan mujahideen, which had been trained by Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and funded by the CIA, would help. Pakistan’s military ruler, General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, made his sales pitch: “The Soviet Union is sitting on our border,” he told an American journalist in a 1980 interview. “Has the free world any interest left in Pakistan?” Later, Zia even surprised the U.S. State Department counselor, Robert McFarlane, with a sweetener: “Why don’t you ask us to grant [you] bases?”
The United States was no longer interested in bases in Pakistan, but it did want to use Pakistan as a staging ground for the Afghan insurgency. So Washington not only funneled arms and money to the mujahideen across the border but also quadrupled its aid to Pakistan. Islamabad had been repeatedly asking for F-16 fighter aircraft in the late 1970s and early 1980s; the Reagan administration found a way to grant them, even urging Congress to waive a ban on military and economic aid to countries that acquire or transfer nuclear technology. James Buckley, then undersecretary of state for international security affairs, rationalized in The New York Times that such American generosity would address “the underlying sources of insecurity that prompt a nation like Pakistan to seek a nuclear capability in the first place.” In 1983, the first batch of the fighter jets arrived in Rawalpindi.
But as did the 1965 war between India and Pakistan, so the Soviet decision to withdraw its forces from Afghanistan in 1989 exposed the tensions beneath the surface of the U.S.-Pakistani alliance. Differences between Washington and Islamabad over who should lead a post-Soviet Afghanistan quickly emerged and unsettled the two countries’ unspoken truce. Pakistan, of course, wanted as much influence as possible, believing that a friendly Afghanistan would provide it with strategic depth against India. The United States wanted a stable noncommunist government that could put Afghanistan back in its place as a marginal regional power.
For the first time, the issue of Pakistani support for terrorist groups also became a sore point. In a 1992 letter to Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, Nicholas Platt, the U.S. ambassador to Pakistan, warned that the United States was close to declaring Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism: “If the situation persists, the secretary of state may find himself required by law to place Pakistan in the U.S.G. [U.S. government] state sponsors of terrorism list. . . . You must take concrete steps to curtail assistance to militants and not allow their training camps to operate in Pakistan or Azad Kashmir [the Pakistan-controlled part of Kashmir].” That threat was hollow, but the United States did find other ways to punish its erstwhile ally. In 1991, Washington cut off military aid to Pakistan after President George H. W. Bush failed to certify to Congress that Pakistan was adhering to its nuclear nonproliferation commitments. Between 1993 and 1998, the United States imposed strict sanctions on Pakistan because of its continued nuclear progress and tests. And it imposed more sanctions between 2000 and 2001 in response to the 1999 military coup that brought General Pervez Musharraf to power. Civilian aid, meanwhile, bottomed out.
WITH US OR AGAINST US
Acrimony continued to color the relationship until 2001, when, after the 9/11 attacks, Washington once again sought to work with Islamabad, hoping that this time, Pakistan would fix its internal problems and change its strategic direction for good. But there was little enthusiasm among Pakistan’s public or its military elite, where the country’s decision-making power lay, for an embrace of the United States or its vision for the region. Meanwhile, Pakistani diplomats in the United States spent most of their time responding to Congress’ criticism of Pakistan’s double-dealing in regard to terrorists. The role of ambassador during this period was first held by a former journalist, Maleeha Lodhi, and then by a career foreign service officer, Ashraf Qazi. They worked to build the case that Pakistan was the frontline state in the war on terrorism by reaching out to the U.S. media and lobbying Congress with the help of the growing Pakistani American community. With support from the George W. Bush administration, the ambassadors were able to fend off criticism and get huge aid packages approved. But skeptics, such as the journalist Selig Harrison, pointed out that Pakistan was selling “bad policy through good salesmen.” These particular salesmen were succeeded by two retired generals, Jehangir Karamat and Mahmud Ali Durrani, who attempted to work more closely with U.S. military officers, assuring them that reports of continued Pakistani support for the Afghan Taliban were exaggerated. On the U.S. side, Anthony Zinni, who had been commander of the U.S. Central Command at the time of Musharraf’s coup and remained in touch with Musharraf after his own retirement, spoke publicly of the benefit of being able to communicate “soldier to soldier.” Still, the soldier-ambassadors were unable to overcome the negative press about Pakistan’s involvement in Afghanistan.
U.S. ambassadors to Pakistan during this period focused on forging close ties with the country’s leader, Musharraf. When Musharraf’s control weakened toward the end of the decade, Anne Patterson, who was U.S. ambassador between 2007 and 2010, tried to reach out to civilian Pakistani politicians by meeting the leaders of all of the country’s major political parties. To cover the waterfront, Admiral Mike Mullen, who was chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, pursued a personal friendship with Pakistan’s army chief, General Ashfaq Kayani. Mullen held 26 meetings with Kayani in four years and often described him as a friend. But by the end of his tenure, Mullen expressed frustration that nothing had worked to change Kayani’s focus: “In choosing to use violent extremism as an instrument of policy, the government of Pakistan, and most especially the Pakistani army and ISI,” he said in a speech to the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2011, “jeopardizes not only the prospect of our strategic partnership but Pakistan’s opportunity to be a respected nation with legitimate regional influence.”
In the end, during Patterson’s and Mullen’s tenures, Musharraf’s regime crumbled and a civilian government took office. From the start, the new administration, led by Zardari, sought to transform the U.S.-Pakistani relationship into what he called a strategic partnership. Zardari wanted to mobilize popular and political support in Pakistan for counterterrorism, as the United States made a long-term commitment to Pakistan through a multiyear foreign assistance package including more civilian aid. At the same time, the two countries would work together to devise a mutually acceptable Afghan endgame.
As Pakistan’s ambassador to the United States from 2008 to 2011, I tried to carry out this agenda and serve as a bridge between the two sides. I arranged dozens of meetings among civilian and military leaders from both sides. Senior U.S. officials, including James Jones, the national security adviser; Hillary Clinton, the secretary of state; and Leon Panetta, the director of the CIA and later secretary of defense, were generous with their time. Senators John McCain, Diane Feinstein, and Joseph Lieberman hashed out the various elements of a strategic partnership, and Senator John Kerry spent countless hours constructing models for Afghan negotiations. Richard Holbrooke, who was the Obama administration’s special envoy for Afghanistan and Pakistan before his death in 2011, shuttled between the capitals, seeking to explain U.S. policies to Pakistani officials and secure congressional support for Pakistan. Over several weekends, when our spouses were away from Washington, Holbrooke and I spent hours together, going to the movies or meeting for lunch in Georgetown. We spoke about ways to secure a U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan with Pakistan’s support. Convinced that the Pakistani military held the key to stability in the region, President Barack Obama conveyed to Pakistan that the United States wanted to help Pakistan feel secure and be prosperous but that it would not countenance Pakistan’s support for jihadist groups that threatened American security.
But in the end, these attempts to build a strategic partnership got nowhere. The civilian leaders were unable to smooth over the distrust between the U.S. and Pakistani militaries and intelligence agencies. And the lack of full civilian control over Pakistan’s military and intelligence services meant that, as ever, the two countries were working toward different outcomes. Admittedly, however, things might not have been all that much better had the civilians been in full control; it is easier for strongmen to give their allies what they want regardless of popular wishes, whether it be U-2 and drone bases or arming the Afghan mujahideen. My own tenure as ambassador came to an abrupt end in November 2011, just weeks after an American businessman of Pakistani origin falsely accused me of using him as an intermediary to seek American help in thwarting a military coup immediately after the U.S. raid that killed bin Laden. The allegation made no sense because as ambassador, I had direct access to American officials and did not need the help of a controversial businessman to convey concerns about the Pakistani military threatening civilian rule. The episode confirmed again, if confirmation was needed, that supporting close ties with the United States is an unpopular position in Pakistan and that there is a general willingness in Pakistan’s media, judicial, and intelligence circles to believe the worst of anyone trying to mend the frayed partnership.
TILL THE BITTER END
Given this history of failure, it is time to reconsider whether the U.S.-Pakistani alliance is worth preserving. At least for the foreseeable future, the United States will not accept the Pakistani military’s vision of Pakistani preeminence in South Asia or equality with India. And aid alone will not alter Islamabad’s priorities. Of course, as Pakistan’s democracy grows stronger, the Pakistanis might someday be able to have a realistic debate about what the national interest is and how it should be pursued. But even that debate might not end on terms the United States likes. According to 2012 poll data, for example, although most Pakistanis would favor better ties with India (69 percent of those polled), a majority of them still see India as the country’s biggest threat (59 percent).
With the United States and Pakistan at a dead end, the two countries need to explore ways to structure a nonallied relationship. They had a taste of this in 2011 and 2012, when Pakistan shut down transit lines in response to a NATO drone strike on the Afghan-Pakistani border that killed 24 Pakistani soldiers. But this failed to hurt the U.S. war effort; the United States quickly found that it could rely on other routes into Afghanistan. Doing so was more costly, but the United States’ flexibility demonstrated to Islamabad that its help is not as indispensable to Washington as it once assumed. That realization should be at the core of a new relationship. The United States should be unambiguous in defining its interests and then acting on them without worrying excessively about the reaction in Islamabad.
The new coolness between the two countries will eventually provoke a reckoning. The United States will continue to do what it feels it has to do in the region for its own security, such as pressing ahead with drone strikes on terrorist suspects. These will raise hackles in Islamabad and Rawalpindi, where the Pakistani military leadership is based. Pakistani military leaders might make noise about shooting down U.S. drones, but they will think long and hard before actually doing so, in light of the potential escalation of hostilities that could follow. Given its weak hand (which will grow even weaker as U.S. military aid dries up), Pakistan will probably refrain from directly confronting the United States.
Once Pakistan’s national security elites recognize the limits of their power, the country might eventually seek a renewed partnership with the United States — but this time with greater humility and an awareness of what it can and cannot get. It is also possible, although less likely, that Pakistani leaders could decide that they are able to do quite well on their own, without relying heavily on the United States, as they have come to do over the last several decades. In that case, too, the mutual frustrations resulting from Pakistan’s reluctant dependency on the United States would come to an end. Diplomats of both countries would then be able to devote their energies to explaining their own and understanding the other’s current positions instead of constantly repeating clashing narratives of what went wrong over the last six decades. Even if the breakup of the alliance did not lead to such a dramatic denouement, it would still leave both countries free to make the tough strategic decisions about dealing with the other that each has been avoiding. Pakistan could find out whether its regional policy objectives of competing with and containing India are attainable without U.S. support. The United States would be able to deal with issues such as terrorism and nuclear proliferation without the burden of Pakistani allegations of betrayal. Honesty about the true status of their ties might even help both parties get along better and cooperate more easily. After all, they could hardly be worse off than they are now, clinging to the idea of an alliance even though neither actually believes in it. Sometimes, the best way forward in a relationship lies in admitting that it’s over in its current incarnation.
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SID HARTH • a minute ago Jinnah: neither angel nor demon
Pakistan’s founder was a complex figure. A controversial new book rightly challenges zealous fictions about him
guardian.co.uk,
Monday 31 August 2009 11.00 EDTIn his analysis of a new book about Jinnah, Kapil Komireddi accuses the author, Jaswant Singh, of “bowdlerising zealously”
to rid Pakistan’s founder of the “blame of partition”. Yet Kapil’s
account omits certain important facts relevant to any discussion of how
the “ambassador of Hindu-Muslim unity” came to found one of the modern
world’s only two states carved in the name of a religion (the other
being Israel).To suggest that the story of a man as complex as
Jinnah can be told without omissions in the confines of an opinion piece
would be unfair to the man and to the storyteller. Kapil errs not in
that he makes omissions in the story but that he attempts to tell the
story at all in such a confined space. As Kapil rightly points out,
Jinnah was, by all accounts, a secular constitutionalist and staunch
Indian nationalist for most of his career. The story of how he became
the voice of the movement that sought British India’s division across
religious lines is a complex early 20th century drama involving
conflicting personalities and fractured identities set against the
backdrop of a dying empire.The leading characters in this drama – Nehru, Gandhi, Jinnah, Patel, Iqbal
– are variously worshipped and demonised in modern India and Pakistan.
Yet, they are all merely human, children of India’s first tryst with
modernity, individuals trying to make sense of their own very different
histories to conjure visions of their future, who, in doing so, happen
to alter the history of the subcontinent forever.Their stories
are rich and worthy of being told and retold, and for anyone interested
in how modern India and Pakistan came to be, their relationships with
one another are worth examining in detail. These are stories of evolving
identities in which we find the Harrow and Cambridge educated Mr Nehru
becoming Pandit Nehru; barrister Gandhi becoming Mahatma Gandhi; Sir Iqbal becoming Allama
Iqbal; and, the most fascinating of them all, the provincial Mahomedali
Jinnahbhai transforming into the Savile Row-fitted Mr MA Jinnah, before
finally settling on the Persianic Quaid-e-Azam. These are splendid,
complex, brilliant men, each guided by his own sense of self and
nationhood, who come together to dismantle the British Raj, yet part
ways when the end is in sight.It is thus unfortunate that these
fascinating individuals must always be seen through the prism of their
greatest collective failure: the sequence of wholly avoidable events
leading to the bloodbath of partition.
And as events of great human tragedy often do, the story of partition
has become a deeply divisive and political issue in modern India and
Pakistan.The two countries have evolved competing histories of
the event and the persons responsible for it: India sees the creation of
Pakistan as a result of machinations by Jinnah, his band of Muslim
League cronies and the conniving, departing British; Pakistan imagines
its birth as a result of a hard-fought historic struggle against the
twin evils of British imperialism and Hindu majoritarianism.It is
in this wide chasm between two competing falsehoods that Singh finds
his space. In Singh’s book a new Jinnah is born, a much more human
Jinnah, neither the demon hated in India nor the hero worshipped in
Pakistan: a self-made man in an era of princes and privilege, driven by
ambition to the pinnacle of success, yet held back by circumstance; a
person whose intransigence was fed by that of those he was up against;
and one whose resolve eventually broke him and the India he had set out
to free.His argument, drawn from primary sources of the time,
centres on the sense of insecurity bred in the psyche of Muslim
leadership as a result of what they perceived to be gains of Hindus, as
represented by the Congress,
at their expense. The level to which these fears were real is, of
course, open to debate among historians, but as Singh explains, this
“minority syndrome” amongst Muslim leadership caused religion to become
the field where battles over federalism, socialism, modernism, and
Indian identity are fought between these highly complex personalities.He
is, of course, not the first to challenge the historiography of
partition. As early as 1960, Ram Manohar Lohia, an active member of the
nationalist movement, had published a book called Guilty Men of India’s Partition, which criticized Nehru and Patel’s acquiescence to partition. In her 1985 book The Sole Spokesman,
Pakistani historian Ayesha Jalal examined the last decade of British
power in India and reached similar conclusions as Singh as to the causes
of India’s partition.Kapil is wrong to dismiss Singh’s work – he
does an important job in straddling the important boundary between
academic, polemical and popular histories and reaching a conclusion that
challenges both prevailing national narratives. Needless to say, it
helps that Singh
is one of modern India’s most prominent individuals, and has the
ability to generate a greater popular effect than the most erudite of
academics: the fact that his book has been banned in Gujarat,
while sad and reprehensible, speaks volume for the level of discomfort
his narrative is causing to that of the Indian establishment’s. He may
ultimately be wrong – the strength of his evidence leads me to suspect
he is more right than most existing accounts – but the very existence of
his work should serve to kindle a long overdue soul-searching in both
countries as to how we see ourselves, our leaders and each other. When
it comes to the question of Jinnah, independence, India and partition,
zealotry must give way to intelligent discourse if we are to ever
exorcise the ghosts of partition.Modern Asian Studies >
Vol. 17, No. 4, 1983 >
Jinnah and the Pakistan…
Modern Asian Studies
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/31…
Jinnah and the Pakistan Demand
R. J. MoorePage 529 of 529-561
Modern Asian Studies © 1983 Cambridge University Press
Books
Jinnah, Pakistan and Islamic Identity: The Search for Saladin By Akbar Ahmed
Pages displayed by permission of Routledge. Copyright.That
freedom can never be attained by a nation without suffering and
sacrifice has been amply borne out by the recent tragic happenings in
this subcontinent.Muhammad Ali Jinnah
…and I am Sid Harth@elcidharth.com
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JIGER PATEL • 5 days ago Pakistan has a very complex psyche, for one reason or another it has to portray someone as a enemy for its own survival. What I am perplexed by is how United States uses tax money to “aid” a country which sold nuclear secrets to our biggest enemies, North Korea and Iran, and why it is not strengthening ties with India— only country in region which is pluralistic and democratic. US needs to minimize its relationship with Pakistan and the aid should only be given economic growth or for secular education.
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Swami • 9 days ago Friendship with India .. unpopular. Friendship with US .. unpopular. What does Pakistan military want ? Its delusional if it thinks it can take on India and US with aid money to prop it up. The vision from rest of the world is that its on the verge of implosion. You cant have a violent population and a teetering economy with weak and corrupt leadership. There is no economic strategy to feed the rapidly growing population and raise their standard of living, when they can see on television how the world is advancing. The world should have called the bluff long time ago, but they have messed up their Pakistan policy.
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